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War for profit : Army contracting vs. supporting the troops /

"WASHINGTON - The Army official who managed the Pentagon's largest contract in Iraq says he was ousted from his job when he refused to approve paying more than 1 billion in questionable charges to KBR ..." (James Risen, New York Times, June 17, 2008). This book by that very Army offic...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Smith, Charles M. (Contracts manager)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: New York : Algora Pub., 2012.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Machine generated contents note: Do We Really Support the Troops?
  • What Is At Risk?
  • Questions of Loyalty and Responsibility
  • Background
  • My Relationship to the Army
  • Service Contracts
  • A Note on Contractual Interpretation
  • Acknowledgements
  • ch. 1 Overrun By The Taliban, Then By KBR
  • Setting the Stage
  • Field Support
  • A Fateful Suggestion
  • September
  • Changes Everything
  • Into Kuwait and Iraq
  • Forward to Baghdad
  • The Green Zone
  • Camps Slayer and Cropper
  • Camp Anaconda
  • ch. 2 "Tooth To Tail"
  • Logistics
  • US Logistics after Vietnam
  • LOGCAP is Born
  • Reality Intervenes: LOGCAP Immediately Diverges from Original Intent
  • LOGCAP II: Down a Slippery Slope
  • Contractor vs. Army Cost Analysis
  • LOGCAP II and the Move to AMC
  • LOGCAP III: Sliding Away
  • ch. 3 LOGCAP III
  • Government Contracts
  • Contract Types
  • Firm Fixed-Price Contracts (FFP)
  • Cost Reimbursement Contracts
  • Cost-Plus-A-Percentage-Of-Cost Contracts
  • Note continued: Cost-Plus-Award-Fee Contracts (CPAF)
  • Cost-Plus-Award-Fee Contracts under LOGCAP
  • The LOGCAP Award Fee Plan
  • Organizational Structure for Award Fee Administration
  • LOGCAP III and Support to Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom
  • ch. 4 Army Contracts And Reversed Incentives
  • ch. 5 Negotiation, Settlement and Fee
  • Dining Facility Overcharges
  • Award Fee Boards
  • Army Award Fee Board Testimony
  • Impact of Army Award Fee Management
  • Use of Cost Type Contracts
  • ch. 6 Dining Facilities, Fraud And Bribes
  • Poor Quality Meals
  • Fraud
  • Bribes
  • Bribery as a Prevalent Problem
  • False Claims
  • ch. 7 Water Problems
  • Army Response
  • ch. 8 Electrical Work
  • Washington International/Black and Veatch
  • KBR-MERO
  • Level A-B-C-Maintenance
  • Actions of the Contracting Officer Forward
  • Results
  • Other Electrocutions in Iraq
  • Investigations
  • Investigations Completed in the Everett Case
  • The Incident
  • Note continued: Observations
  • Equipment
  • Site Visit
  • Government Contractor Involvement
  • Conclusions
  • Staff Sergeant Christopher Everett
  • More Moral Hazard
  • ch. 9 Transportation
  • Empty Trucks on the Road
  • The April 9 Incident
  • Reefers
  • Other Transportation Contractors
  • Tactical Vehicle Maintenance
  • ch. 10 The Struggle For Congressional Oversight
  • REP Henry Waxman and the House Committee on Oversight and Investigations
  • SEN Byron Dorgan and the Senate Democratic Policy Committee
  • SEN Carl Levin and the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC)
  • REP Andrews and the House Armed Services Committee
  • SEN Claire McCaskill and the Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight (SOCO)
  • The Congressional Research Service (CRS)
  • The Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
  • The Government Accountability Office (GAO)
  • Requesting an Investigation
  • The Commission on Wartime Contracting
  • What Has the Commission Actually Done?
  • Note continued: Missed Opportunities in a Target Rich Environment
  • (1).FAR 52.216-26, Payments of Allowable Costs before Definitization
  • (2).Subcontracting by KBR under LOGCAP
  • (3).Force Protection
  • (4).Award Fee
  • Summing up the Commission on Wartime Contracting
  • Conclusions
  • ch. 11 The Use Of Contractors For Combat Service Support
  • Outsourcing
  • Risk Analysis
  • Risks of Using Contractors
  • Advantages of Using Civilian Contractors
  • Cost Analysis
  • Adjustments to the CBO Study
  • Cost/Benefit Analysis
  • Army officers examine the risks of LOGCAP
  • Conclusion
  • ch. 12 Use Of Contractors To Oversee Other Contractors
  • The Problem of Contracting Out Oversight of Contractors
  • What Are Inherently Governmental Functions?
  • A Case Study
  • Reviewing the LOGCAP Support Contract
  • Some Additional Background Information
  • What Went Wrong this Time?
  • This Problem Is Not Restricted to DoD Contracting
  • Conclusion
  • ch. 13 Lessons Learned
  • Note continued: LOGCAP IV
  • Improved Requirements Control
  • Additional Contract Oversight Resources
  • Improved Electrical Safety
  • We Can Do Better
  • Recommendations
  • The Need for a Federal Contract Audit Agency
  • Curing the Military/Corporate Complex
  • Conclusion.