Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Commemorative Edition).

This is the classic work upon which modern-day game theory is based. What began more than sixty years ago as a modest proposal that a mathematician and an economist write a short paper together blossomed, in 1944, when Princeton University Press published Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. In it...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Morgenstern, Oskar (Autor)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Princeton University Press 2007.
Temas:
Economics, Mathematical.
Game theory.
Théorie des jeux.
Economics, Mathematical
Game theory
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover; CONTENTS; PREFACE; TECHNICAL NOTE; ACKNOWLEDGMENT; CHAPTER I: FORMULATION OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM; 1. THE MATHEMATICAL METHOD IN ECONOMICS; 1.1. Introductory remarks; 1.2. Difficulties of the application of the mathematical method; 1.3. Necessary limitations of the objectives; 1.4. Concluding remarks; 2. QUALITATIVE DISCUSSIOIN OF THE PROBLEM OF RATIONAL BEHAVIOR; 2.1. The problem of rational behavior; 2.2. "" Robinson Crusoe"" economy and social exchange economy; 2.3. The number of variables and the number of participants; 2.4. The case of many participants: Free competition
  • 2.5. The ""Lausanne"" theory3. THE NOTION OF UTILITY; 3.1. Preferences and utilities; 3.2. Principles of measurement: Preliminaries; 3.3. Probability and numerical utilities; 3.4. Principles of measurement: Detailed discussion; 3.5. Conceptual structure of the axiomatic treatment of numerical utilities; 3.6. The axioms and their interpretation; 3.7. General remarks concerning the axioms; 3.8. The role of the concept of marginal utility; 4. STRUCTURE OF THE THEORY: SOLUTIONS AND STANDARDS OF BEHAVIOR; 4.1. The simplest concept of a solution for one participant
  • 4.2. Extension to all participants4.3. The solution as a set of imputations; 4.4. The intransitive notion of ""superiority"" or ""domination""; 4.5. The precise definition of a solution; 4.6. Interpretation of our definition in terms of ""standards of behavior""; 4.7. Games and social organizations; 4.8. Concluding remarks; CHAPTER II: GENERAL FORMAL DESCRIPTION OF GAMES OF STRATEGY; 5. INTRODUCTION; 5.1. Shift of emphasis from economics to games; 5.2. General principles of classification and of procedure; 6. THE SIMPLIFIED CONCEPT OF A GAME; 6.1. Explanation of the termini technici
  • 6.2. The elements of the game6.3. Information and preliminary; 6.4. Preliminarity, transitivity, and signaling; 7. THE COMPLETE CONCEPT OF A GAME; 7.1. Variability of the characteristics of eath move; 7.2. The general description; 8. SETS AND PARTITIONS; 8.1. Desirability of a set-theoretical description of a game; 8.2. Sets, their properties, and their graphical representation; 8.3. Partitions, their properties, and their graphical representation; 8.4. Logistic interpretation of sets and partitions; *9. THE SET-THEORETICAL DESCRIPTION OF A GAME; *9.1. The partitions which describe a game
  • *9.2. Discussion of these partitions and their properties*10. AXIOMATIC FORMULATION; *10.1. The axioms and their interpretations; *10.2. Logistic discussion of the axioms; *10.3. General remarks concerning the axioms; *10.4. Graphical representation; 11. STRATEGIES AND THE FINAL SIMPLIFICATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OF A GAME; 11.1. The concept of a strategy and its fomalization; 11.2. The final simplification of the description of a game; 11.3. The role of strategies in the simplified form of a game; 11.4. The meaning of the zero-sum restriction; CHAPTER III: ZERO-SUM TWO-PERSON GAMES: THEORY

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