The behavior of federal judges : a theoretical and empirical study of rational choice /

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Federal judges are not just robots or politicians in robes, yet their behavior is not well understood, even among themselves. Using statistical methods, a political scientist, an economist, and a judge construct a unified theory of judicial decision-making to dispel the mystery of how decisions from...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autores principales: Epstein, Lee, 1958- (Autor), Landes, William M. (Autor), Posner, Richard A. (Autor)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2013.
Temas:
Judicial process > United States.
Processus judiciaire > États-Unis.
LAW > Civil Procedure.
LAW > Legal Services.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > Government > Judicial Branch.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > American Government > Judicial Branch.
Judicial process
United States
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • A realistic theory of judicial behavior
  • The previous empirical literature
  • The Supreme Court
  • The Courts of Appelas
  • The district courts and the selection effect
  • Dissents and dissent aversion
  • The questioning of lawyers at oral argument
  • The auditioners.

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