Trust : Representatives and Constituents.

Why do constituents sometimes defer to their representative's judgment, rewarding her for acting as she thinks best, even when she ignores their demands? By making decisions about trust, constituents determine whether their representative is rewarded for implementing their demands or for using...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: University of Michigan Press 2010.
Colección:Michigan studies in political analysis.
Temas:
United States. > Congress > Public opinion.
United States. > Congress
Representative government and representation > United States > Public opinion.
Trust.
Public opinion > United States.
Confidence.
Gouvernement représentatif > États-Unis > Opinion publique.
Confiance.
Opinion publique > États-Unis.
Confidence
Public opinion
Representative government and representation > Public opinion
Trust
Government - U.S.
Law, Politics & Government.
Political Institutions & Public Administration - U.S., Legislative Branch.
United States
Electronic resource.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover
  • Contents
  • 1. Introduction
  • Part 1: A Theory of Trust
  • 2. Trust, Democratic Theory, and the Electoral Connection
  • 3. Assumptions about Decisions and Beliefs
  • 4. The Leeway Hypothesis
  • Part 2: The Theory Applied
  • Introduction to Part 2
  • 5. Raising Pay without Losing Office: The Ethics Act of 1989
  • 6. Analyzing the Inexplicable: The Repeal of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act
  • 7. Conclusions
  • Appendixes
  • 1. The Evaluation Game
  • 2. The Data
  • 3. Fiduciary Behavior under Term Limits
  • References
  • Author Index
  • Subject Index.

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