Political price cycles in regulated industries : theory and evidence /

This paper develops a model of political regulation in which politicians set the regulated price in order to maximize electoral support by signaling to voters a pro-consumer behavior. Political incentives and welfare constraints interact in the model, yielding an equilibrium in which the real price...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autores principales: Paiva, Claudio (Autor), Moita, Rodrigo (Autor)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute, 2006.
Colección:IMF working paper ; WP/06/260.
Temas:
Prices > Government policy.
Price regulation.
Prix > Politique gouvernementale.
Price regulation
Prices > Government policy
Acceso en línea:Texto completo

MARC

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100 1 |a Paiva, Claudio,  |e author. 
245 1 0 |a Political price cycles in regulated industries :  |b theory and evidence /  |c prepared by Claudio Paiva and Rodrigo Moita. 
260 |a [Washington, D.C.] :  |b International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute,  |c 2006. 
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504 |a Includes bibliographical references. 
588 0 |a Print version record. 
520 |a This paper develops a model of political regulation in which politicians set the regulated price in order to maximize electoral support by signaling to voters a pro-consumer behavior. Political incentives and welfare constraints interact in the model, yielding an equilibrium in which the real price in a regulated industry may fall in periods immediately preceding an election. The paper also provides empirical support for the theoretical model. Using quarterly data from 32 industrial and developing countries over 1978-2004, we find strong statistical and econometric evidence pointing toward the existence of electoral price cycles in gasoline markets. 
506 |3 Use copy  |f Restrictions unspecified  |2 star  |5 MiAaHDL 
533 |a Electronic reproduction.  |b [Place of publication not identified] :  |c HathiTrust Digital Library,  |d 2011.  |5 MiAaHDL 
538 |a Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.  |u http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212  |5 MiAaHDL 
583 1 |a digitized  |c 2011  |h HathiTrust Digital Library  |l committed to preserve  |2 pda  |5 MiAaHDL 
505 0 |a Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. BACKGROUND -- III. A MODEL OF A POLITICAL PRICE CYCLES IN A REGULATED INDUSTRY -- IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE -- V. CONCLUDING REMARKS -- Appendix 1. List of Countries Included in the Empirical Work -- REFERENCES 
546 |a English. 
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650 0 |a Prices  |x Government policy. 
650 0 |a Price regulation. 
650 6 |a Prix  |x Politique gouvernementale. 
650 7 |a Price regulation  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Prices  |x Government policy  |2 fast 
700 1 |a Moita, Rodrigo,  |e author. 
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776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a Paiva, Claudio.  |t Political price cycles in regulated industries.  |d [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute, 2006  |w (OCoLC)144528592 
830 0 |a IMF working paper ;  |v WP/06/260. 
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