Maritime Delimitation and Interim Arrangements in North East Asia.

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Annotation "This work will be a useful guide for those who look for rules and practice on the relations between neighboring States in the absence of maritime boundaries. The main question the author is trying to tackle is how to handle the relations between neighboring coastal States when there...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Kim, Sun Pyo (Autor)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Leiden : Boston : Brill Academic Publishers Brill Academic Publishers [distributor] Feb. 2004
Colección:Publications on Ocean Development Ser. ; vol. 40.
Temas:
Territorial waters > East Asia.
Economic zones (Law of the sea) > East Asia.
Continental shelf > East Asia.
Continental shelf
Economic zones (Law of the sea)
Territorial waters
East Asia
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Acknowledgements
  • Abbreviations
  • Table of Maps
  • Table of Cases
  • Introduction
  • Chapter 1: What Makes Maritime Delimitation Difficult?
  • 1. Mare Clausum in Dispute
  • 2. Inherent Difficulties in Delimiting Boundaries of the EEZ/Continental Shelf
  • 2.1. Various Factors
  • 2.2. Lack of Clear Rules for Maritime Delimitation
  • 2.3. Political Nature of Maritime Delimitation
  • 2.4. Sovereignty Disputes over Islands
  • 2.5. Inefficiency of the Dispute Settlement Procedure
  • 3. Observations
  • Chapter 2: Which Law Governs in the Absence of Maritime Boundaries?
  • 1. Can a Unilateral Equidistance Line be a Solution?
  • 1.1. Delimitation of Boundaries and Provisional Lines
  • 1.2. Rules under the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf
  • 1.3. Rules under the LOS Convention
  • 1.4. The Need for Searching for Rules in the Disputed Areas
  • 2. Drafting History of Articles 74(3)/83(3) of the LOS Convention
  • 2.1. General Background
  • 2.2. The First Discussion at the Second Session of UNCLOS III
  • 2.3. From Median Line (ISNT) to Provisional Arrangements (RSNT)
  • 2.4. Median Line, Moratorium, or Provisional Arrangement?
  • 2.5. Consensus for Mutual Arrangements
  • 3. Meaning of Articles 74(3)/83(3) of the LOS Convention
  • 3.1. Provisional Measures and Provisional Arrangements
  • 3.2. Legal Nature of Arrangements in Terms of the Law of Treaties
  • 3.3. Requirements for an Arrangement to be of a Practical Nature
  • 3.4. Obligations of Coastal States before Delimitation
  • 3.5. Provisional Arrangements and Interests of Third Parties
  • 4. Protection of the Marine Environment in Disputed Areas
  • 5. Marine Scientific Research in Disputed Waters.
  • 5.1. Can a Coastal State Conduct Marine Scientific Research in the Disputed Areas Without Consent from the Other Coastal State?
  • 5.2. Does the Marine Scientific Research Conducted by State A, Without Any Protests, Reinforce Its Claims to the Part of the Disputed Area or Natural Resources in the Disputed Area?
  • 5.3. Can a Third State Conduct Marine Scientific Research in a Disputed Area Without Consent from Any of Two Coastal States?
  • 6. Observations
  • Chapter 3: Practice on Provisional Arrangements in Disputed Areas
  • 1. Possible Provisional Arrangements in Disputed Areas.
  • 2. Policy Option 1: Joint Development Zones
  • 2.1. Kuwait-Saudi Arabia
  • 2.2. South Korea-Japan
  • 2.3. Malaysia-Thailand
  • 2.4. Malaysia-Vietnam
  • 2.5. Australia-Indonesia
  • 2.6. United Kingdom-Argentina in the South West Atlantic
  • 3. Policy Option 2: Joint Fishing Zones
  • 3.1. Grey Zones
  • 3.2. Joint Fishing Zones Focusing on Specific Fish Stocks
  • 3.3. White Zones
  • 4. Policy Option 3: Fisheries Arrangement on the Basis of De Facto Boundaries
  • 4.1. Fisheries Agreement between the USSR and Japan.

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