Sovereign insurance and program design : what is optimal for the sovereign? /

The design of the optimal sovereign insurance contract is analyzed when: the sovereign chooses the contract; effort is not contractible; shocks are of uncertain magnitude; the sovereign can save; and the sovereign can default. Under these conditions: i) an ex ante premium leads to higher coverage; i...

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Bibliographic Details
Call Number:Libro Electrónico
Main Author: Messmacher, Miguel (Author)
Corporate Authors: International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:Inglés
Published: [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute, 2006.
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/06/64.
Subjects:
International Monetary Fund.
Fonds monétaire international.
International Monetary Fund
Insurance > Econometric models.
Moral hazard > Econometric models.
International finance > Econometric models.
Assurance > Modèles économétriques.
Risque moral > Modèles économétriques.
Finances internationales > Modèles économétriques.
Insurance > Econometric models
International finance > Econometric models
Online Access:Texto completo
Table of Contents:
  • Contents
  • I. INTRODUCTION
  • II. MORAL HAZARD AND SOVEREIGN INSURANCE
  • III. BASIC MODEL STRUCTURE AND THE ROLE OF INSURANCE
  • IV. AN ALTRUISTIC INSURER
  • V. DEFAULT BY THE COUNTRY
  • VI. CONCLUSIONS
  • VII. DERIVATION OF THE RESULTS
  • REFERENCES

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