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Sovereign insurance and program design : what is optimal for the sovereign? /
The design of the optimal sovereign insurance contract is analyzed when: the sovereign chooses the contract; effort is not contractible; shocks are of uncertain magnitude; the sovereign can save; and the sovereign can default. Under these conditions: i) an ex ante premium leads to higher coverage; i...
| Cote: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Auteur principal: | |
| Collectivités auteurs: | , |
| Format: | Électronique eBook |
| Langue: | Inglés |
| Publié: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute,
2006.
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| Collection: | IMF working paper ;
WP/06/64. |
| Sujets: | |
| Accès en ligne: | Texto completo |