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Sovereign insurance and program design : what is optimal for the sovereign? /
The design of the optimal sovereign insurance contract is analyzed when: the sovereign chooses the contract; effort is not contractible; shocks are of uncertain magnitude; the sovereign can save; and the sovereign can default. Under these conditions: i) an ex ante premium leads to higher coverage; i...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Autores Corporativos: | , |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute,
2006.
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| Colección: | IMF working paper ;
WP/06/64. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
| Sumario: | The design of the optimal sovereign insurance contract is analyzed when: the sovereign chooses the contract; effort is not contractible; shocks are of uncertain magnitude; the sovereign can save; and the sovereign can default. Under these conditions: i) an ex ante premium leads to higher coverage; ii) the premium increases with the sovereign's incentive to take risks; iii) a deductible is chosen to limit moral hazard; iv) the deductible-to-support ratio is decreasing with the size of the realized shock; and v) the change in the choice of savings when insurance is available is ambiguous, as there is a trade-off between inducing higher effort and increasing the likelihood of default. |
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| Notas: | "March 2006." |
| Descripción Física: | 1 online resource (28 pages) : illustrations |
| Bibliografía: | Includes bibliographical references. |
| ISBN: | 128351558X 9781283515580 9781451908602 1451908601 1462312489 9781462312481 145278647X 9781452786476 9786613828033 6613828033 |
| ISSN: | 2227-8885 ; |