Simple, implementable fiscal policy rules /

This paper analyzes the scope for systematic rules-based fiscal activism in open economies. Relative to a balanced budget rule, automatic stabilizers significantly improve welfare. But they minimize fiscal instrument volatility rather than business cycle volatility. A more aggressively countercyclic...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autores principales: Kumhof, Michael (Autor), Laxton, Douglas (Autor)
Autor Corporativo: International Monetary Fund. Research Department
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: [Washington, DC] : International Monetary Fund (IMF), ©2009.
Colección:IMF working paper ; WP/09/76.
Temas:
Fiscal policy.
Politique fiscale.
Fiscal policy
Finanzpolitik.
Offene Volkswirtschaft.
Regelgebundene Politik.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo

MARC

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245 1 0 |a Simple, implementable fiscal policy rules /  |c prepared by Michael Kumhof and Douglas Laxton. 
260 |a [Washington, DC] :  |b International Monetary Fund (IMF),  |c ©2009. 
300 |a 1 online resource (41 pages) :  |b color illustrations 
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504 |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 38-41). 
588 0 |a Print version record. 
520 |a This paper analyzes the scope for systematic rules-based fiscal activism in open economies. Relative to a balanced budget rule, automatic stabilizers significantly improve welfare. But they minimize fiscal instrument volatility rather than business cycle volatility. A more aggressively countercyclical tax revenue gap rule increases welfare gains by around 50 percent, with only modest increases in fiscal instrument volatility. For raw materials revenue gaps the government should let automatic stabilizers work. The best fiscal instruments are targeted transfers, consumption taxes and labor taxes. 
506 |3 Use copy  |f Restrictions unspecified  |2 star  |5 MiAaHDL 
533 |a Electronic reproduction.  |b [Place of publication not identified] :  |c HathiTrust Digital Library,  |d 2011.  |5 MiAaHDL 
538 |a Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.  |u http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212  |5 MiAaHDL 
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505 0 |a I. Introduction; II. Literature Survey; III. The Model; A. Households; 1. Infinitely Lived Households; 2. Liquidity Constrained Households; B. Manufacturing; C. Copper Production; D. Distribution; E. Government; 1. Monetary Policy; 2. Fiscal Policy; F. Fiscal Policy Rules; 1. Chile's Structural Surplus Rule; 2. A Tax Revenue Gap Targeting Rule; 3. A Tax Revenue Gap Instrument Rule; G. Shocks; H. Equilibrium and Balance of Payments; I. Computation of Welfare; IV. Calibration; A. Steady State; B. Policy Rules, Adjustment Costs and Shocks; Tables; 1. Key Moments of the Data; V. Results 
505 8 |a A. Monetary RulesB. Impulse Responses; C. Welfare; D. Fiscal Instrument Volatility; E. Welfare -- Fiscal Instrument Volatility Efficiency Frontiers; F. Macroeconomic Volatility; G. Other Real Activity Gaps?; H. Openness; I. Alternative Fiscal Instruments; VI. Conclusion; Figures; 1. IRF for Technology Shock; 2. IRF for Investment Shock; 3. IRF for Copper Demand Shock; 4. Welfare for Tax Revenue Gap Rule; 5. Fiscal Instrument Volatility for Tax Revenue Gap Rule; 6. Efficiency Frontiers; 7. Macroeconomic Volatility for Tax Revenue Gap Rule; 8. Openness; 9. Welfare and Fiscal Instruments 
505 8 |a 10. Fiscal Volatility for Different Fiscal InstrumentsAppendices; 1. Optimality Conditions of the Model; 2. Welfare Computations; References 
546 |a English. 
590 |a ProQuest Ebook Central  |b Ebook Central Academic Complete 
650 0 |a Fiscal policy. 
650 6 |a Politique fiscale. 
650 7 |a Fiscal policy  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Finanzpolitik.  |2 stw 
650 7 |a Offene Volkswirtschaft.  |2 stw 
650 7 |a Regelgebundene Politik.  |2 stw 
700 1 |a Laxton, Douglas,  |e author. 
710 2 |a International Monetary Fund.  |b Research Department. 
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830 0 |a IMF working paper ;  |v WP/09/76. 
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