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Towards a principal-agent based typology of risks in public-private partnerships /
There is a strong economic rationale for close cooperation between the public and private sectors. This has resulted in a significant increase in the demand for the provision of public services through instruments combining public and private money such as public-private partnerships (PPPs or P3s)....
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Autor Corporativo: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund,
©2009.
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| Colección: | IMF working paper ;
WP/09/177. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
| Sumario: | There is a strong economic rationale for close cooperation between the public and private sectors. This has resulted in a significant increase in the demand for the provision of public services through instruments combining public and private money such as public-private partnerships (PPPs or P3s). We describe these arrangements and explore how they can be analyzed using standard tools in economics (incentives and principal-agent theory). We discuss the implications of our approach in terms of identifying risks that are often overlooked before turning to the optimal risk-sharing between the public and private partners, in particular with respect to information asymmetries in risk perceptions. This allows us to propose a typology of the risks associated with PPPs, where both internal risks (the risks associated with the contract) and external risks (those associated with the project) are considered. |
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| Notas: | Title from PDF title page (viewed October 6, 2009). "Offices in Europe." "August 2009." |
| Descripción Física: | 1 online resource (24 pages) |
| Bibliografía: | Includes bibliographical references. |
| ISBN: | 9781451917505 1451917503 |
| ISSN: | 2227-8885 ; |