Strategic foundations of general equilibrium : dynamic matching and bargaining games /
"This book, written by contemporary economic theorists, reports on a major research program to provide strategic foundations for the theory of perfect competition."
Call Number: | Libro Electrónico |
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Main Author: | |
Format: | Electronic eBook |
Language: | Inglés |
Published: |
Cambridge ; New York :
Cambridge University Press,
2000.
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Series: | Churchill lectures in economics.
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Texto completo |
Table of Contents:
- Markets and games
- Strategic foundations of perfect competition
- Why strategic foundations?
- Cooperative market games
- Non-cooperative market games
- Dynamic matching and bargaining models
- Open questions
- Perfect competition
- Pure exchange economics
- Dynamic matching and bargaining games
- Equilibrium
- The Edgeworth Property
- Efficiency
- Competitive sequences of economies
- Existence
- Efficiency with discounting
- Random matching
- Mixed equilibria
- A summing up
- Continuity and anonymity
- Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990)
- Bounded rationality and uniqueness
- The Limit Principle
- Repeated games
- Limited memory
- Large anonymous games
- Non-anonymous games
- Bounded rationality
- Imitation and experimentation
- A behavioral model of competition
- Convergence to competitive prices
- Extensions.