Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts

This book investigates the ways in which social norms and bounded rationality shape different contracts in the real world. It brings into focus existing research into optimal contracts, draws important lessons from that research, and outlines prospects for future investigation. Bounded rationality h...

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Bibliographic Details
Call Number:Libro Electrónico
Main Author: Basov, Suren (Author)
Corporate Author: SpringerLink (Online service)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:Inglés
Published: Singapore : Springer Nature Singapore : Imprint: Springer, 2016.
Edition:1st ed. 2016.
Series:Studies in Economic Theory, 30
Subjects:
Experimental economics.
Experimental Economics.
Online Access:Texto Completo
Table of Contents:
  • Chapter 1 Preface
  • Part I Mechanism Design under Bounded Rationality
  • Chapter 2 Introduction
  • Chapter 3 Complexity constraints and mechanism design
  • Chapter 4 Learning, probabilistic choice, and mechanism design
  • Chapter 5 Some other models of mechanism design under bounded rationality
  • Chapter 6 Conclusions
  • Part II Social Norms and Mechanism Design
  • Chapter 7 Peer Pressure and Agency Relationship
  • Chapter 8 Statistical Mechanics of High Performing Working Systems
  • Chapter 9 Optimal contracting in social environment
  • Part III Lessons learnt and directions for future research.

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