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Auctions in the Electricity Market Bidding when Production Capacity Is Constrained /

Electricity is an essential commodity traded at power exchanges. Its price is very volatile within a day and over the year. This raises questions about the efficiency of the trading rules. The author develops a non-cooperative auction model analyzing the bidding behavior of producers at power exchan...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Schöne, Stefan (Autor)
Autor Corporativo: SpringerLink (Online service)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer, 2009.
Edición:1st ed. 2009.
Colección:Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 617
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto Completo

MARC

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100 1 |a Schöne, Stefan.  |e author.  |4 aut  |4 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut 
245 1 0 |a Auctions in the Electricity Market  |h [electronic resource] :  |b Bidding when Production Capacity Is Constrained /  |c by Stefan Schöne. 
250 |a 1st ed. 2009. 
264 1 |a Berlin, Heidelberg :  |b Springer Berlin Heidelberg :  |b Imprint: Springer,  |c 2009. 
300 |a XVI, 218 p. 40 illus.  |b online resource. 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
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490 1 |a Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems,  |x 2196-9957 ;  |v 617 
505 0 |a Literature Review -- Model -- Results -- Conclusion. 
520 |a Electricity is an essential commodity traded at power exchanges. Its price is very volatile within a day and over the year. This raises questions about the efficiency of the trading rules. The author develops a non-cooperative auction model analyzing the bidding behavior of producers at power exchanges. Producers are limited by the production capacity of their power plants. Production costs are affiliated. This allows for independence or positive correlation. The author analyzes and compares a uniform-price, a discriminatory, and a generalized second-price auction. Optimal bids, cost efficiency, profits, and consumer prices are examined. A simple probability density function of affiliated production costs is given and used for examples. Numerical results are presented. The results of the analysis can help improving the bidding strategies of producers, selecting the best auction type at power exchanges or detecting price manipulations. 
650 0 |a Environmental economics. 
650 0 |a Energy policy. 
650 0 |a Energy and state. 
650 0 |a Microeconomics. 
650 0 |a Macroeconomics. 
650 0 |a Electric power production. 
650 1 4 |a Environmental Economics. 
650 2 4 |a Energy Policy, Economics and Management. 
650 2 4 |a Microeconomics. 
650 2 4 |a Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics. 
650 2 4 |a Electrical Power Engineering. 
650 2 4 |a Mechanical Power Engineering. 
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830 0 |a Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems,  |x 2196-9957 ;  |v 617 
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