Non-Bayesian Decision Theory Beliefs and Desires as Reasons for Action /

This book aims to present an account of rational choice from a non-Bayesian point of view. Rational agents maximize subjective expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, the author argues that utility and subjective probability should not be defined in terms of preferences over...

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Bibliographic Details
Call Number:Libro Electrónico
Main Author: Peterson, Martin (Author)
Corporate Author: SpringerLink (Online service)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:Inglés
Published: Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands : Imprint: Springer, 2008.
Edition:1st ed. 2008.
Series:Theory and Decision Library A:, Rational Choice in Practical Philosophy and Philosophy of Science, 44
Subjects:
Science-Philosophy.
Operations research.
Computer science-Mathematics.
Mathematical statistics.
Game theory.
Econometrics.
Philosophy of Science.
Operations Research and Decision Theory.
Probability and Statistics in Computer Science.
Game Theory.
Quantitative Economics.
Online Access:Texto Completo
Table of Contents:
  • Bayesian decision theory
  • Choosing what to decide
  • Indeterminate preferences
  • Utility
  • Subjective probability
  • Expected utility
  • Risk aversion.

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