Issues in corporate governance and finance /

While Advances continues to publish papers from any area of Finance, the focus of this issue is on corporate governance, broadly defined as the system of controls that helps corporations and other organizations effectively manage, administer, and direct economic resources. Papers deal with the role...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Otros Autores: Hirschey, Mark, John, Kose, Makhija, Anil K.
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Amsterdam ; Oxford : Elsevier JAI, 2007.
Colección:Advances in financial economics ; v. 12.
Temas:
Corporate governance.
Corporations > Finance.
Gouvernement d'entreprise.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Corporate & Business History.
Corporate governance
Corporations > Finance
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover
  • Contents
  • List of Contributors
  • Part I: Issues in Corporate Governance
  • Chapter 1. Managerial Power in the Design of Executive Compensation: Evidence from Japan
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Japanese Executive Option Programs, Data Sources, and Sample Characteristics
  • 3. Empirical Findings
  • 4. Conclusion
  • Notes
  • References
  • Chapter 2. Market-Value-Maximizing Ownership Structure when Investor Protection is Weak
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. The Relation of firm Market Value to Ownership Structure
  • 3. Data and Variable Construction
  • 4. Empirical Results
  • 5. Summary and Conclusions
  • Notes
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • Chapter 3. Corporate Governance and Performance of Banking Firms: Evidence from Asian Emerging Markets
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Corporate Governance Literature Review
  • 3. Data and Methodology
  • 4. Results and Discussions
  • 5. Conclusions
  • References
  • Chapter 4. On the Duty of Care of Institutional Investors: Evidence on Participation of Mutual fund Managers in Shareholder Meetings in Israel
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Hypotheses
  • 3. The Data
  • 4. Empirical Results
  • 5. Conclusions
  • Notes
  • References
  • Appendix
  • Chapter 5. Good Managers Invest More and Pay Less Dividends: A Model of Dividend Policy
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Motivation
  • Dividends and Executive Compensation
  • 3. The Model
  • 4. Robustness Check-Extensions of the Model
  • 5. Empirical Implication
  • 6. Discussions
  • 7. Conclusion
  • Notes
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • Appendix
  • Proof of Propositions
  • Chapter 6. Corporate Downsizing and CEO Compensation
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Background
  • 3. Data and Methodology
  • 4. CEO Compensation
  • 5. Operating Performance
  • 6. Announcement Period Returns
  • 7. Summary and Conclusions
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • Chapter 7. The External Monitoring Bodies' view of the Board Independence in the New Public Family Firms
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Family Firms in the IPO Process
  • 3. Data and Sample Characteristics
  • 4. Empirical Methodology and Results
  • 5. Summary and Conclusions
  • Notes
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • Chapter 8. Ownership Structure, Financial rent and Performance: Evidence from the Malaysian Manufacturing Sector
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Ownership Structure, Leverage and firm Value: Hypotheses
  • 3. Data and Model Specification
  • 4. Findings
  • 5. Sensitivity Analysis
  • 6. Summary and Conclusions
  • Notes
  • References
  • Chapter 9. Board of Director Configurations in Mutual Fund Sponsors: Early Evidence of Board-Level Performance
  • 1. The Board of Directors and the Agency Relationship
  • 2. Methodology
  • 3. Results
  • 4. Conclusions
  • Notes
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • Chapter 10. Expropriation, weak Corporate Governance and Post-IPO Performance: Chinese Evidence
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Literature Review
  • 3. RPT P.

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