Unfunded pension systems : ageing and migration /

Pension systems in most industrialised countries are unfunded, i.e. they are pay-as-you-go financed and thus depend on a well-balanced ratio (old) recipients to (young) contributors. This so-called dependency ratio will worsen significantly in the next few decades due to two developments: ageing of...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Uebelmesser, Silke
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Amsterdam ; London : Elsevier, 2004.
Colección:Contributions to economic analysis ; 264.
Temas:
Pensions.
Emigration and immigration > Economic aspects.
Demographic transition.
Pensions
Émigration et immigration > Aspect économique.
Transition démographique.
pensions (compensation)
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Personal Finance > Retirement Planning.
Rentenfinanzierung
Umlageverfahren
Pensioen.
Veroudering (demografie)
Migratie (demografie)
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover
  • Introduction to the Series
  • Preface
  • Contents
  • Chapter 1. Introduction
  • 1.1 Focus of the analysis
  • 1.2 Structure and overview
  • Chapter 2. Unfunded Pension Systems
  • 2.1 Mechanisms of unfunded and funded pension systems
  • 2.2 The concept of implicit taxes and implicit debt
  • 2.3 Conclusion
  • Appendix A2. Solow-Swan growth model
  • Appendix B2. Derivation of Equation 2.28
  • Chapter 3. Projected Development of Fundamental Factors
  • 3.1 Determinants of the population growth
  • 3.2 Development of the total population
  • 3.3 Conclusion
  • Appendix A3. Development of the population
  • Appendix B3. Dependency ratio
  • Chapter 4. Country Studies
  • 4.1 Characteristics of pension systems
  • 4.2 Recent reforms of pension systems
  • 4.3 Conclusion
  • Chapter 5. Welfare Analysis of Pension Reforms
  • 5.1 Intergenerationally efficient reforms
  • 5.2 Intrapersonally efficient reforms
  • Appendix A5. Standardised work biographies
  • Appendix B5. Derivation of Equation 5.14
  • Appendix C5. Description of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)
  • Appendix D5. Estimates for the wage equation: men and married women
  • Appendix E5. Results of the Tobit model: smaller sub-groups
  • Appendix F5. Time structure of implicit taxes and wage elasticities
  • Chapter 6. Political Feasibility of Pension Reforms
  • 6.1 Intergenerational redistribution
  • 6.2 Voting model
  • 6.3 Feasibility of pension reforms
  • 6.4 Conclusion
  • Appendix A6. Calculating the median age
  • Appendix B6. Calculating the indifference age
  • Chapter 7. Mobility as a Counterforce to Gerontocracy
  • 7.1 Voting model with mobility
  • 7.2 Mobility as a commitment device
  • Appendix A7. Social planner problem
  • Appendix B7. Monetary costs of education
  • Chapter 8. Qualitative Aspects of Migration
  • 8.1 Description of the data
  • 8.2 Estimation of the intention to migrate
  • 8.3 Conclusion
  • Appendix A8. Descriptive statistics
  • Appendix B8. Probit estimation
  • Appendix C8. Probit model
  • Chapter 9. Sustainability of Pension Systems with Systems Competition
  • 9.1 Status quo
  • 9.2 Theoretical results when pension systems are similar
  • 9.3 Institutional distribution of competence between the national and the European Level
  • 9.4 Comparison of the theoretical and institutional results
  • 9.5 Alternative options when pension systems are different
  • 9.6 Conclusion
  • Appendix A9. Art. 117 ToR and Art. 136 ECT
  • Appendix B9. Art. 118 ToR and Art. 137 ECT
  • Chapter 10. Conclusion
  • References
  • Symbol Glossary
  • Subject Index
  • Last Page.

Ejemplares similares