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How to Prevent Coups d'État : Counterbalancing and Regime Survival /

"In this book Erica De Bruin shows that how rulers design and organize their coercive institutions affects the survival of their regimes. Balancing the military with republican guards, secret police, and militia makes attempts to oust rulers more likely to fail. However, counterbalancing carrie...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: De Bruin, Erica, 1982- (Autor)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Ithaca [New York] : Cornell University Press, 2020.
Colección:Book collections on Project MUSE.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo

MARC

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100 1 |a De Bruin, Erica,  |d 1982-  |e author. 
245 1 0 |a How to Prevent Coups d'État :   |b Counterbalancing and Regime Survival /   |c Erica De Bruin. 
264 1 |a Ithaca [New York] :  |b Cornell University Press,  |c 2020. 
264 3 |a Baltimore, Md. :  |b Project MUSE,   |c 2020 
264 4 |c ©2020. 
300 |a 1 online resource (216 pages). 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references and index. 
505 0 |a Introduction: Preventing Coups d'etat -- The Logic of Counterbalancing -- Counterbalancing and Coup Failure -- How Counterbalancing Works: Testing the Causal Mechanisms -- An Effective Deterrent? Counterbalancing and Coup Attempts -- Challenges to Building Coercive Institutions -- How Coups d'etat Escalate to Civil War -- Conclusion: Coercive Institutions and Regime Survival. 
520 |a "In this book Erica De Bruin shows that how rulers design and organize their coercive institutions affects the survival of their regimes. Balancing the military with republican guards, secret police, and militia makes attempts to oust rulers more likely to fail. However, counterbalancing carries risks. When forces outside the regular military chain of command compete for arms and recruits, resentment among military officers can provoke coup attempts even as counterbalancing creates obstacles to a coup's execution."--  |c Provided by publisher. 
588 |a Description based on print version record. 
650 0 |a National security. 
650 0 |a Civil-military relations. 
650 0 |a Military policy. 
650 0 |a Political stability. 
650 0 |a Political leadership. 
650 0 |a Balance of power. 
650 0 |a Civil war  |x Prevention. 
650 0 |a Coups d'etat  |x Prevention. 
655 7 |a Electronic books.   |2 local 
776 1 8 |i Print version:  |a De Bruin, Erica, 1982-  |t How to prevent coups d'etat  |d Ithaca [New York] : Cornell University Press, 2020  |z 9781501751912  |w (DLC) 2020005767 
710 2 |a Project Muse.  |e distributor 
830 0 |a Book collections on Project MUSE. 
856 4 0 |z Texto completo  |u https://projectmuse.uam.elogim.com/book/78371/ 
945 |a Project MUSE - Custom Collection 
945 |a Project MUSE - 2020 Complete 
945 |a Project MUSE - 2020 History