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Political Economy for Public Policy
This textbook uses modern political economy to introduce students of political science, government, economics, and public policy to the politics of the policymaking process. The book's distinct political economy approach has two virtues. By developing general principles for thinking about polic...
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| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Princeton University Press,
2016.
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| Colección: | Book collections on Project MUSE.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Summary of Contents; Contents; Policy Applications; Preface; For Whom Is This Book Written?; A Word on Tone and Technicality; Acknowledgments; Introduction; Three Goals; The Role of Models; Why Rationality?; I NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS; 1 Normative Frameworks; 1.1 What Is a Normative Framework?; 1.1.1 Private vs. Public Morality; 1.2 Utilitarianism; 1.2.1 Why Be a Utilitarian?; 1.2.2 Some Problems for Utilitarianism; 1.3 Egalitarianism; 1.3.1 Equality of Outcomes; 1.3.2 Equality of Opportunity; 1.4 Kantian Deontology.
- 1.4.1 Deontology and the Challenges to Utilitarianism1.4.2 Challenges for Deontological Thinking; 1.5 Libertarianism; 1.5.1 Why Be a Libertarian?; 1.5.2 Some Problems for Libertarianism; 1.6 Takeaways; 1.7 Further Reading; 1.8 Exercises; 2 Collective Goals; 2.1 Rational Individuals; 2.2 Aggregation Procedures; 2.3 Evaluative Criteria for Aggregation Procedures; 2.3.1 Transitivity of Social Preferences; 2.3.2 Unanimity; 2.3.3 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives; 2.4 Arrow's Theorem; 2.5 Social Decisions Instead of Social Preferences; 2.6 The Public Interest?
- 2.6.1 Only Two Alternatives: May's Theorem2.6.2 Ruling Out Some Collections of Preferences: The Median Voter Theorem; 2.6.3 Intensity of Preferences; 2.6.4 Agreement; 2.7 Takeaways; 2.8 Further Reading; 2.9 Exercises; 3 Pareto Concepts; 3.1 Pareto Concepts; 3.2 From Pareto Efficiency to Pareto Improvements; 3.3 A Model of Policies and Preferences; 3.3.1 Actions and Transfers; 3.3.2 Quasi Linearity: A Bridge from Pareto Efficiency to Pareto Improvement; 3.4 A Bridge Too Far?; 3.4.1 Limited Transfers and Distributional Concerns; 3.4.2 Non Quasi Linear Preferences.
- 3.5 Relationship to Cost-Benefit Analysis3.6 Are Pareto Improvements Unambiguously in the Public Interest?; 3.7 Takeaways; 3.8 Further Reading; 3.9 Exercises; 3.10 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3.3.1; Summing Up Normative Foundations; II SOCIAL DILEMMAS; 4 Externalities; 4.1 Collective Action; 4.1.1 The Social Dilemma; 4.1.2 Interpretations; 4.2 Public Goods; 4.2.1 Comparison to the First Best or Utilitarian Optimum; 4.2.2 Interpretation; 4.2.3 Concentrated vs. Diffuse Interests; 4.3 The Tragedy of the Commons; 4.3.1 A Pareto Improvement; 4.3.2 The First Best; 4.3.3 Interpretation.
- 4.4 Policy Interventions4.4.1 The Failure of Persuasion; 4.4.2 Pigovian Subsidies and Taxes; 4.4.3 Regulation; 4.5 The Theory of the Second Best; 4.5.1 The Second Best Pigovian Subsidy; 4.6 Alternative Responses; 4.6.1 Altruism; 4.6.2 A Market in Externalities; 4.6.3 Ongoing Relationships and Self Organization; 4.7 Takeaways; 4.8 Further Reading; 4.9 Exercises; 5 Coordination Problems; 5.1 Coordination Failure; 5.1.1 Interpretation; 5.2 Coordination Traps; 5.2.1 A Basic Model of Coordination Traps: Investment in Developing Countries; 5.2.2 A Model of Bank Runs; 5.2.3 A Model of Revolutions.