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020 |a 9780815709091 
020 |z 0815709099 
020 |z 9780815709107 
035 |a (OCoLC)1132222741 
040 |a MdBmJHUP  |c MdBmJHUP 
100 1 |a Binder, Sarah A. 
245 1 0 |a Stalemate :   |b Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock /   |c Sarah A. Binder. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b Brookings Institution Press,  |c 2003. 
264 3 |a Baltimore, Md. :  |b Project MUSE,   |c 2020 
264 4 |c ©2003. 
300 |a 1 online resource (160 pages):   |b illustrations 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
505 0 |a Stalemate in legislative politics -- Unintended consequences of constitutional design -- Measuring the frequency of stalemate -- Institutional and electoral sources of stalemate -- What drives legislative action? -- Consequences of stalemate. 
520 8 |a Annotation  |b Gridlock is not a modern legislative condition. Although the term is said to have entered the American political lexicon after the 1980 elections, Alexander Hamilton complained about it more than two hundred years ago. In many ways, stalemate seems endemic to American politics. Constitutional skeptics even suggest that the framers intentionally designed the Constitution to guarantee gridlock. In Stalemate, Sarah Binder examines the causes and consequences of gridlock, focusing on the ability of Congress to broach and secure policy compromise on significant national issues. Reviewing more than fifty years of legislative history, Binder measures the frequency of deadlock during that time and offers concrete advice for policymakers interested in improving the institutional capacity of Congress. Binder begins by revisiting the notion of "framers' intent," investigating whether gridlock was the preferred outcome of those who designed the American system of separated powers. Her research suggests that frequent policy gridlock might instead be an unintended consequence of constitutional design. Next, she explores the ways in which elections and institutions together shape the capacity of Congress and the president to make public law. She examines two facets of its institutional evolution: the emergence of the Senate as a coequal legislative partner of the House and the insertion of political parties into a legislative arena originally devoid of parties. Finally, she offers a new empirical approach for testing accounts of policy stalemate during the decades since World War II. These measurements reveal patterns in legislative performance during the second half of the twentieth century, showingthe frequency of policy deadlock and the legislative stages at which it has most often emerged in the postwar period. Binder uses the new measure of stalemate to explain empirical patterns in the frequency of gridlock. The r. 
546 |a English. 
588 |a Description based on print version record. 
610 1 7 |a USA  |b Congress  |2 gnd 
610 1 7 |a United States.  |b Congress.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00529490 
610 1 6 |a États-Unis.  |b Congress  |x Vote  |x Histoire. 
610 1 6 |a États-Unis.  |b Congress  |x Histoire. 
610 1 0 |a United States.  |b Congress  |x Voting  |x History. 
610 1 0 |a United States.  |b Congress  |x History. 
650 7 |a Wahlsystem  |2 gnd 
650 7 |a Voting registers.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01169261 
650 7 |a POLITICAL SCIENCE  |x American Government  |x Legislative Branch.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a POLITICAL SCIENCE  |x Government  |x Legislative Branch.  |2 bisacsh 
655 7 |a History.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01411628 
655 7 |a Electronic books.   |2 local 
710 2 |a Project Muse.  |e distributor 
830 0 |a Book collections on Project MUSE. 
856 4 0 |z Texto completo  |u https://projectmuse.uam.elogim.com/book/63665/ 
945 |a Project MUSE - Custom Collection 
945 |a Project MUSE - Archive Complete Supplement VIII 
945 |a Project MUSE - Archive Political Science and Policy Studies Supplement VIII