Cargando…
The Moral Nexus /
The Moral Nexus develops and defends a new interpretation of morality--namely, as a set of requirements that connect agents normatively to other persons in a nexus of moral relations. According to this relational interpretation, moral demands are directed to other individuals, who have claims that t...
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Princeton, New Jersey :
Princeton University Press,
[2019]
|
| Colección: | Book collections on Project MUSE.
|
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
MARC
| LEADER | 00000cam a22000004a 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | musev2_63235 | ||
| 003 | MdBmJHUP | ||
| 005 | 20230905050517.0 | ||
| 006 | m o d | ||
| 007 | cr||||||||nn|n | ||
| 008 | 181214s2019 nju o 00 0 eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9780691183923 | ||
| 020 | |z 9780691172170 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1078923290 | ||
| 040 | |a MdBmJHUP |c MdBmJHUP | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Wallace, R. Jay, |e author. | |
| 245 | 1 | 4 | |a The Moral Nexus / |c R. Jay Wallace. |
| 264 | 1 | |a Princeton, New Jersey : |b Princeton University Press, |c [2019] | |
| 264 | 3 | |a Baltimore, Md. : |b Project MUSE, |c 2019 | |
| 264 | 4 | |c ©[2019] | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource. | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Carl G. Hempel lecture series | |
| 505 | 0 | |a Cover; Title page; Copyright page; Contents; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction; 1.1. Elements of Relational Normativity; 1.2. Overview of the Argument; 2 The Problem of Moral Obligation; 2.1. Practical Requirements: The Basic Challenge; 2.2. Moral Obligation: The Specific Challenge; 2.3. A Relational Approach to Moral Obligation; 2.4. Refining the Picture; 3 Morality as a Social Phenomenon; 3.1. The Interpersonal Significance of Moral Right and Wrong; 3.2. Individualistic and Relational Conceptions of the Moral Right; 3.3. The Relational Structure of Interpersonal Accountability | |
| 505 | 0 | |a 3.4. The Relational Content of Blame4 Relational Requirements without Relational Foundations; 4.1. Obligations and Relationships; 4.2. Self-Standing Relational Requirements; 4.3. Anti-Individualism about the Normative; 4.4. Agent-Relativity and Morality as an Ideal; 5 From Interests to Claims; 5.1. Defining the Manifold: Who Are the Claimholders?; 5.2. Interests, Claims, and Moral Wrongs; 5.3. Moral Justification and Moral Reasoning: From Interests to Claims; 5.4. A Theory of Relational Morality?; 6 Some Practical Consequences; 6.1. Foreseeability, Claims, and Wrongs | |
| 505 | 0 | |a 6.2. Claims without Rights: Imperfect Moral Duties6.3. Numbers and Non-Identity; 6.4. Extramoral Concern for Moral Persons; Notes; Bibliograph; Index | |
| 520 | |a The Moral Nexus develops and defends a new interpretation of morality--namely, as a set of requirements that connect agents normatively to other persons in a nexus of moral relations. According to this relational interpretation, moral demands are directed to other individuals, who have claims that the agent comply with these demands. Interpersonal morality, so conceived, is the domain of what we owe to each other, insofar as we are each persons with equal moral standing. The book offers an interpretative argument for the relational approach. Specifically, it highlights neglected advantages of this way of understanding the moral domain; explores important theoretical and practical presuppositions of relational moral duties; and considers the normative implications of understanding morality in relational terms. The book features a novel defense of the relational approach to morality, which emphasizes the special significance that moral requirements have, both for agents who are deliberating about what to do and for those who stand to be affected by their actions. The book argues that relational moral requirements can be understood to link us to all individuals whose interests render them vulnerable to our agency, regardless of whether they stand in any prior relationship to us. It also offers fresh accounts of some of the moral phenomena that have seemed to resist treatment in relational terms, showing that the relational interpretation is a viable framework for understanding our specific moral obligations to other people. | ||
| 588 | |a Description based on print version record. | ||
| 650 | 7 | |a Normativity (Ethics) |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst01039140 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a PHILOSOPHY |x Social. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a PHILOSOPHY |x Ethics & Moral Philosophy. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Norme (Morale) | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Normativity (Ethics) | |
| 655 | 7 | |a Electronic books. |2 local | |
| 710 | 2 | |a Project Muse. |e distributor | |
| 830 | 0 | |a Book collections on Project MUSE. | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |z Texto completo |u https://projectmuse.uam.elogim.com/book/63235/ |
| 945 | |a Project MUSE - Custom Collection | ||
| 945 | |a Project MUSE - 2019 Complete | ||
| 945 | |a Project MUSE - 2019 Philosophy and Religion | ||