The Theory of Incentives : The Principal-Agent Model /

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Economics has much to do with incentives - not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1947-2004
Otros Autores: Martimort, David
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 2002.
Colección:Book collections on Project MUSE.
Temas:
Anreiz.
Agency-Theorie.
Stimulants dans l'industrie > Modeles mathematiques.
Microeconomie.
Économie politique.
Incentives in industry.
Economics.
Speltheorie.
Transactiekosten.
Agency theorie.
Economie.
Agency-Theorie
Anreiz
economics.
Stimulants dans l'industrie.
Economics
Electronic books.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Incentives in Economic Thought
  • Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture
  • Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management
  • Hume, Wicksell, Groves: The Free-Rider Problem
  • Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting
  • Leon Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies
  • Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance
  • Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives
  • Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination
  • Incentives in Planned Economies
  • Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design
  • Auctions
  • The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
  • The Basic Model
  • The Complete Information Optimal Contract
  • Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts
  • Information Rents
  • The Optimization Program of the Principal
  • The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
  • The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information
  • Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing
  • The Revelation Principle
  • A More General Utility Function for the Agent
  • Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints
  • Commitment
  • Stochastic Mechanisms
  • Informative Signals to Improve Contracting
  • Contract Theory at Work
  • Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection
  • More than Two Types
  • Multidimensional Asymmetric Information
  • Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and Countervailing Incentives
  • Random Participation Constraint
  • Limited Liability
  • Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification
  • Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-Off
  • Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs.

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