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The Theory of Incentives : The Principal-Agent Model /
Economics has much to do with incentives - not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun...
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| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Princeton, N.J. :
Princeton University Press,
2002.
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| Colección: | Book collections on Project MUSE.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
MARC
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| 100 | 1 | |a Laffont, Jean-Jacques, |d 1947-2004. | |
| 245 | 1 | 4 | |a The Theory of Incentives : |b The Principal-Agent Model / |c Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort. |
| 264 | 1 | |a Princeton, N.J. : |b Princeton University Press, |c 2002. | |
| 264 | 3 | |a Baltimore, Md. : |b Project MUSE, |c 2020 | |
| 264 | 4 | |c ©2002. | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (440 pages): |b illustrations ; | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 505 | 0 | 0 | |t Incentives in Economic Thought -- |t Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture -- |t Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management -- |t Hume, Wicksell, Groves: The Free-Rider Problem -- |t Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting -- |t Leon Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies -- |t Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance -- |t Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives -- |t Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination -- |t Incentives in Planned Economies -- |t Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design -- |t Auctions -- |t The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off -- |t The Basic Model -- |t The Complete Information Optimal Contract -- |t Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts -- |t Information Rents -- |t The Optimization Program of the Principal -- |t The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off -- |t The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information -- |t Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing -- |t The Revelation Principle -- |t A More General Utility Function for the Agent -- |t Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints -- |t Commitment -- |t Stochastic Mechanisms -- |t Informative Signals to Improve Contracting -- |t Contract Theory at Work -- |t Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection -- |t More than Two Types -- |t Multidimensional Asymmetric Information -- |t Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and Countervailing Incentives -- |t Random Participation Constraint -- |t Limited Liability -- |t Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification -- |t Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-Off -- |t Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs. |
| 520 | |a Economics has much to do with incentives - not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. | ||
| 588 | |a Description based on print version record. | ||
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Anreiz. |2 swd |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Agency-Theorie. |2 swd |
| 650 | 7 | |a Stimulants dans l'industrie |x Modeles mathematiques. |2 ram | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Microeconomie. |2 ram | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Économie politique. |2 ram | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Incentives in industry. |2 nli | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Economics. |2 nli | |
| 650 | 1 | 7 | |a Speltheorie. |2 gtt |
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| 650 | 6 | |a Stimulants dans l'industrie. | |
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| 650 | 2 | |a Economics | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Incentives in industry. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Economics. | |
| 655 | 7 | |a Electronic books. |2 local | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Martimort, David. | |
| 710 | 2 | |a Project Muse. |e distributor | |
| 830 | 0 | |a Book collections on Project MUSE. | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |z Texto completo |u https://projectmuse.uam.elogim.com/book/62380/ |
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| 945 | |a Project MUSE - Archive Complete Supplement VIII | ||
| 945 | |a Project MUSE - Archive Political Science and Policy Studies Supplement VIII | ||