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180709s2002 nju o 00 0 eng d |
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|a 9780691188003
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|z 9780691016702
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|z 9780691092577
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|a (OCoLC)1132224136
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|a MdBmJHUP
|c MdBmJHUP
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|a Drazen, Allan.
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245 |
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|a Political Economy in Macroeconomics /
|c Allan Drazen.
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264 |
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|a Princeton, N.J. :
|b Princeton University Press,
|c 2002, 2000.
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264 |
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3 |
|a Baltimore, Md. :
|b Project MUSE,
|c 2020
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264 |
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|c ©2002, 2000.
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|a 1 online resource:
|b illustrations
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|a text
|b txt
|2 rdacontent
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|a computer
|b c
|2 rdamedia
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|a online resource
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|2 rdacarrier
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|g Part I:
|t Basic issues and tools of analysis.
|g 1.
|t What is a political economy?
|t Politics and economics --
|t Types of heterogeneity --
|t An illustration of approaches --
|t Plan of the book --
|g 2.
|t Economic models for political analysis.
|t The principal-agent problem --
|t Discrete time dynamic models -- dynamic programming --
|t The overlapping generations model --
|t Effects of uncertain future policies --
|g 3.
|t Decisionmaking mechanisms.
|t How much political detail? --
|t Choosing decisionmaking mechanisms --
|t Direct democracy --
|t Representative democracy --
|t Multiparty systems --
|t Interest groups and lobbying --
|t Transaction cost politics --
|g Part II:
|t Commitment, credibility, and reputation.
|g 4.
|t The time-consistency problem.
|t Capital taxation --
|t Time inconsistency as a conflict of interests --
|t The Barro-Gordon model --
|t Seigniorage revenue and the optimum quantity of money --
|t Commitment versus flexibility --
|g 5.
|t Laws, institutions, and delegated authority.
|t Laws, constitutions, and social contracts --
|t Delegation of authority --
|t Central bank independence --
|t Fiscal structures for time consistency --
|g 6.
|t Credibility and reputation.
|t Reputation --
|t "Reputation" under complete information --
|t Reputation under incomplete information -- mimicking --
|t Does reputation "solve" the time-consistency problem? Three caveats --
|t Signaling --
|t Reputation for not reneging on commitments --
|t Credibility and external circumstances --
|t Ambiguity, secrecy, and imprecise control --
|g Part III:
|t Heterogeneity and conflicting interests --
|g 7.
|t Elections and changes of policymakers.
|t Elections and policymaker performance --
|t The opportunistic political business cycle --
|t Partisan political cycles --
|t Competence and prospective voting --
|t Campaign promises --
|t Interactions of the executive and the legislature --
|t Multiparty systems and endogenous election dates --
|t Tying the hands of one's replacement --
|g 8.
|t Redistribution.
|t Redistribution of income --
|t Differential transfers --
|t Nonmonetary redistribution --
|t Rent seeking and predation --
|t Intergenerational redistribution --
|t Redistribution and mobility --
|g 9.
|t Public goods.
|t Public goods -- the neoclassical approach --
|t Provision of public goods in practice --
|t Voluntary provision of public goods -- free riders and collective action --
|t Voluntary provision of public goods -- clubs --
|t The static public goods game --
|t The war of attrition in public goods provision --
|g 10.
|t Inaction, delay, and crisis.
|t Economic arguments --
|t Vested interests --
|t Nonadoption due to uncertainty about individual benefits --
|t "Communication" failures --
|t Conflict over the burden of reform --
|t Common property models --
|t Economic crises --
|g Part IV:
|t Application to policy issues.
|g 11.
|t Factor accumulation and growth.
|t Basic models of fiscal policy and capital accumulation --
|t Imperfect capital markets, externalities, and endogenous income distribution --
|t Political institutions and regimes --
|t Socio-political instability --
|t Empirical determinants of growth --
|g 12.
|t The international economy.
|g pt. 1.
|t Exchange-rate arrangements.
|t Fixed versus flexible exchange rates --
|t Currency crises and contagious speculative attacks --
|t Monetary unions --
|g pt. 2.
|t Macroeconomic interdependence.
|t International policy cooperation --
|t Political responses to external shocks --
|g pt. 3.
|t International capital and aid flows.
|t Capital controls --
|t Sovereign borrowing --
|t Foreign aid --
|g 13.
|t Economic reform and transition.
|t Defining the issues.
|t Economic and oolitical constraints --
|t The implications of magnitude -- a formal analysis --
|t Heterogeneity and political constraints --
|t Labor reallocation --
|t Privatization --
|t Price liberalization --
|g 14.
|t The size of government and the number of nations.
|t The scope of government --
|t The size of government -- government spending --
|t Government debt and deficits --
|t Budgetary rules and institutions --
|t The number of nations.
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520 |
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|a Allan Drazen focuses on the implications of political and economic outcomes rather than polictical and public choice per se limiting his coverage to macroeconomics.
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588 |
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|a Description based on print version record.
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650 |
|
7 |
|a Science politique.
|2 ram
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Prise de decision
|x Modeles mathematiques.
|2 ram
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Macroeconomie.
|2 ram
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Prise de decision.
|2 ram
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Techniques de decision en politique.
|2 ram
|
650 |
1 |
7 |
|a Macro-economie.
|2 gtt
|
650 |
1 |
7 |
|a Economische politiek.
|2 gtt
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Policy sciences.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst01068796
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Macroeconomics.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst01005221
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Economics.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst00902116
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Decision making.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst00889035
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Macroeconomie.
|2 eclas
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Prise de decision.
|2 eclas
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Politique.
|2 eclas
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Science economique.
|2 eclas
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a POLITICAL SCIENCE
|x Public Policy
|x Economic Policy.
|2 bisacsh
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a economics.
|2 aat
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a decision making.
|2 aat
|
650 |
|
6 |
|a Économie politique.
|
650 |
|
6 |
|a Sciences de la politique.
|
650 |
|
6 |
|a Prise de decision.
|
650 |
|
6 |
|a Macroeconomie.
|
650 |
|
2 |
|a Economics
|
650 |
|
2 |
|a Decision Making
|
650 |
|
0 |
|a Economics.
|
650 |
|
0 |
|a Policy sciences.
|
650 |
|
0 |
|a Decision making.
|
650 |
|
0 |
|a Macroeconomics.
|
655 |
|
7 |
|a Electronic books.
|2 local
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710 |
2 |
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|a Project Muse.
|e distributor
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830 |
|
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|a Book collections on Project MUSE.
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856 |
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|z Texto completo
|u https://projectmuse.uam.elogim.com/book/60940/
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945 |
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|a Project MUSE - Custom Collection
|
945 |
|
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|a Project MUSE - Archive Complete Supplement VIII
|
945 |
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|a Project MUSE - Archive Political Science and Policy Studies Supplement VIII
|