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Experienced Wholeness : Integrating Insights from Gestalt Theory, Cognitive Neuroscience, and Predictive Processing /
An interdisciplinary account of phenomenal unity, investigating how experiential wholes can be characterized and how such characterizations can be analyzed computationally. How can we account for phenomenal unity? That is, how can we characterize and explain our experience of objects and groups of o...
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| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
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Cambridge, MA :
MIT Press,
[2017]
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| Colección: | Book collections on Project MUSE.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Intro; Contents; List of Figures; Preface and Acknowledgments; I: Setting the Scene; 1. Introduction; 1.1 A Brief Sketch of the Account Developed and Defended in This Book; 1.2 Reflection on Methods; 1.2.1 Why an Interdisciplinary Account?; 1.2.2 How Is an Interdisciplinary Account of Phenomenal Unity Possible?; 1.3 Phenomenal Unity and Access Unity; 1.3.1 What Aspects of Conscious Experience Are Accessible in the First Place?; 1.3.2 Access Unity; 1.4 Why Anti-Representationalists Should Read This Book; 2. Framing the Problem of Phenomenal Unity (PPU); 2.1 Basic Conceptual Considerations.
- 2.1.1 What Is a Phenomenal Field?2.1.2 What Is a Phenomenal Part?; 2.1.3 What Is a Subject of Experience?; 2.1.4 The First and the Second Problems of Phenomenal Unity; 2.2 Diachronic and Synchronic Unity; 2.3 Core Constraints on Accounts of Phenomenal Unity; 2.3.1 Constraint 1: Phenomenality; 2.3.2 Constraint 2: Globality; 2.3.3 Constraint 3: Necessity; 2.4 Interim Conclusion; II: The First Problem of Phenomenal Unity; 3. Why the Single State Conception Does Not Solve the Problem of Phenomenal Unity; 3.1 The Single State Conception (SSC); 3.2 SSC Creates Avoidable Problems.
- 3.3 SSC Does Not Solve PPU3.3.1 Tim Bayne's Account of Phenomenal Unity Does Not Solve 1PPU; 3.3.2 The Metaphysical Digression Suggested by Bayne's Account Is a Dead End; 3.4 Interim Conclusion; 4. What Is It Like to Experience a Third Man? The Phenomenological Bradley and How to Solve It; 4.1 The Phenomenological Bradley: A Phenomenological Dual to Bradley's Regress; 4.2 Phenomenal Fundament; 4.2.1 Short Description; 4.2.2 Historical Precursors; 4.3 Phenomenal Glue; 4.3.1 Short Description; 4.3.2 A Historical Precursor and One Current Account; 4.4 Phenomenal Replacement.
- 4.4.1 Short Description4.4.2 Historical Precursors and One Current Account; 4.5 Phenomenal Disposition; 4.5.1 Short Description; 4.5.2 One Historical Precursor and Two Current Accounts; 4.6 The MÃlange Model: Integrating Different Solutions; 4.7 Interim Conclusion; 5. Think Globally, Experience Locally?; 5.1 Understanding Globality; 5.2 Holism and Consciousness; 5.2.1 Michael Esfeld's Generic Holism; 5.2.2 Holistic Theories of Consciousness; 5.3 Strong Phenomenal Holism?; 5.3.1 Aristotle: Dynamic Unity; 5.3.2 Max Wertheimer: Principles of Perceptual Organization.
- 5.3.3 Aron Gurwitsch: Whole-Parts5.3.4 Elijah Chudnoff's Phenomenal Holism; 5.3.5 John Searle on Building Block and Unified Field Theories; 5.3.6 Tim Bayne on Atomistic and Holistic Theories of Consciousness; 5.3.7 Barry Dainton's Phenomenal Holism; 5.4 The Plausible Alternative: Relax and Go Hierarchical; 5.5 Multiplicity; 5.5.1 The Intuition; 5.5.2 Historical Precursors and Relations to Existing Accounts; 5.5.3 Summary; 5.6 Graduality; 5.6.1 The Intuition; 5.6.2 Historical Precursors and Relations to Existing Accounts; 5.6.3 Summary; 5.7 Invariance; 5.7.1 The Intuition.