Sumario: | "High-security organizations around the world face devastating threats from insiders--trusted employees with access to sensitive information, facilities, and materials. From Edward Snowden to the Fort Hood shooter to the theft of nuclear materials, the threat from insiders is on the front page and at the top of the policy agenda. [This book] offers ... case studies of insider disasters across a range of different types of institutions, from biological research laboratories, to nuclear power plants, to the U.S. Army. [The editors] outline cognitive and organizational biases that lead organizations to downplay the insider threat, and they synthesize 'worst practices' from these past mistakes, offering lessons that will be valuable for any organization with high security and a lot to lose. Insider threats pose dangers to anyone who handles information that is secret or proprietary, material that is highly valuable or hazardous, people who must be protected, or facilities that might be sabotaged. [This book offers] case studies across a range of industries and contexts, allowing entities such as nuclear facilities and casinos to learn from each other. It also offers an unprecedented analysis of terrorist thinking about using insiders to get fissile material or sabotage nuclear facilities."--
|