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A Mark of the Mental : In Defense of Informational Teleosemantics /
Drawing on insights from causal theories of reference, teleosemantics, and state space semantics, a theory of naturalized mental representation.
| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge, MA :
MIT Press,
[2017]
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| Colección: | Book collections on Project MUSE.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
MARC
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| 035 | |a (OCoLC)990182874 | ||
| 040 | |a MdBmJHUP |c MdBmJHUP | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Neander, Karen, |e author. | |
| 245 | 1 | 2 | |a A Mark of the Mental : |b In Defense of Informational Teleosemantics / |c Karen Neander. |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, MA : |b MIT Press, |c [2017] | |
| 264 | 3 | |a Baltimore, Md. : |b Project MUSE, |c 2017 | |
| 264 | 4 | |c ©[2017] | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (344 pages): |b illustrations | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Life and mind | |
| 505 | 0 | |a Acknowledgments; 1 Thinking about Thought; Brentano's Problem; Naturalism, Consciousness, and Intentionality; From Informational Content to Representational Content; Original versus Derived Intentionality; Representations, Targets, and Contents; Semantic Evaluations; Teleosemantics; Overview of What Is to Come; 2 Positing Nonconceptual Representations; A First Example; A Second Example: AH's Visual Deficit; The Inference to Normal Perceivers; Representational (as Opposed to Informational) Content; Intensional Ascriptions; The Formality Assumption. | |
| 505 | 0 | |a Sharpening the Methodological ConundrumSemantic Externalism; Concluding Remarks; 3 Functional Analysis and the Species Design; How-Questions and Why-Questions; A Division of Explanatory Labor for SE and CR Functions?; Minimal and Normal-Proper Functions; Questioning Thesis 3; Solving the Generalization Problem; The Properly Functioning System; Is It Idealization?; Related Views; Concluding Remarks; 4 The Methodological Argument for Informational Teleosemantics; The Bare-Bones Version; Premise 1; Premises 2 and 3; Premises 4 and 5; Premise 6; From Methodology to Metaphysics. | |
| 505 | 0 | |a Teleosemantics: The Only Game in Town?Fodor's (Teleosemantic) Asymmetric-Dependency Theory; Cummins' (Teleosemantic) Picture Theory; Concluding Remarks; 5 Simple Minds; Why Anuran Perception Is Not a Toy Example; Sign-Stimuli and Prey-Capture in a Toad; Information Flow in the Neural Substrate; The Localization Content; What Is Represented?; An Attenuated Form of Verificationism?; Concluding Remarks; 6 Response Functions; Starting Teleosemantics at the Right End; Functions as Selected Dispositions; How Blind Is Natural Selection?; Normal Conditions versus Normal Causes. | |
| 505 | 0 | |a Unsuitable Analyses of InformationA Simple Causal Analysis of Information; Information-Carrying Functions; Concluding Remarks; 7 The Content-Determinacy Challenges; Six Content-Determinacy Challenges; The Simple Starter Theory: CT; Distinguishing Locally Co-Instantiated Properties; Distinguishing Properties Mutually Implicated in Selection; A Note on Color Realism; Seeing Green versus Seeing Grue; Mach Diamonds versus Ordinary Squares; Concluding Remarks; 8 Causally Driven Analogs; Inner Worlds Mirroring Outer Worlds; Analog Representations; The Second-Order Similarity Rule. | |
| 505 | 0 | |a Traditional Objections to Similarity-Based ContentWho Specifies the Isomorphism?; The Pictorial Intuition and Color Realism (Again); The Missing Shade of Blue; Representing Determinates of Determinables; Berkeley's Problem of Abstraction; A Neo-Lockean Strategy; A Neo-Humean Proposal; Concluding Remarks; 9 Distal and Distant Red Squares; The Problem of Distal Content; Informational Asymmetries in Response Functions; Other Solutions; Perceptual Constancies and Distal Content; Hallucinated Red Squares: In the World or Just in the Head?; Binding to Spatiotemporal Representation. | |
| 520 | |a Drawing on insights from causal theories of reference, teleosemantics, and state space semantics, a theory of naturalized mental representation. | ||
| 588 | |a Description based on print version record. | ||
| 650 | 7 | |a Semantics (Philosophy) |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst01112094 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Reference (Philosophy) |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst01092367 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Mental representation. |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst01016620 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Intentionality (Philosophy) |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst00975963 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a SCIENCE |x Cognitive Science. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a PHILOSOPHY |x Movements |x Humanism. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Semantique (Philosophie) | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Reference (Philosophie) | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Representation mentale. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Intentionnalite (Philosophie) | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Semantics (Philosophy) | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Reference (Philosophy) | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Mental representation. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Intentionality (Philosophy) | |
| 655 | 7 | |a Electronic books. |2 local | |
| 710 | 2 | |a Project Muse. |e distributor | |
| 830 | 0 | |a Book collections on Project MUSE. | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |z Texto completo |u https://projectmuse.uam.elogim.com/book/52543/ |
| 945 | |a Project MUSE - Custom Collection | ||
| 945 | |a Project MUSE - 2017 Complete | ||
| 945 | |a Project MUSE - 2017 Philosophy and Religion | ||