Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic /

Mostrar otras versiones (1)

This book addresses a significant area of applied social-choice theory--the evaluation of voting procedures designed to select a single winner from a field of three or more candidates. Such procedures can differ strikingly in the election outcomes they produce, the opportunities for manipulation tha...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Merrill, Samuel, 1939-
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1988.
Colección:Book collections on Project MUSE.
Temas:
Theorie.
Wahlsystem.
Kandidatenaufstellung.
Theorie
Wahlsystem
Kandidatenaufstellung
Voting > Mathematical models.
Political science > Decision making > Mathematical models.
Game theory.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > Government > Legislative Branch.
Politique > Prise de decision > Modeles mathematiques.
Science politique > Prise de decision > Modeles politiques.
Theorie des jeux.
Vote > Modeles mathematiques.
Game Theory
Electronic books.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Frontmatter
  • CONTENTS
  • LIST OF FIGURES
  • LIST OF TABLES
  • PREFACE
  • ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
  • CHAPTER 1. Multicandidate Elections: Choosing a Winner
  • CHAPTER 2. Condorcet Efficiency
  • CHAPTER 3. Social-Utility Efficiency
  • CHAPTER 4. The Effect of Alternative Spatial Models on Condorcet and Social-Utility Efficiency
  • CHAPTER 5. Strategic Voting under Plurality Electoral Systems: Decisions under Uncertainty and under Risk
  • CHAPTER 6. Strategic Voting and Its Effects on Condorcet Efficiency
  • CHAPTER 7. Strategic Voting for Approval Balloting under Alternative Decision Rules
  • CHAPTER 8. Empirical Estimates for Single-Vote Plurality and Approval Voting
  • CHAPTER 9. Other Criteria for Assessing Voting Systems
  • CHAPTER 10. Conclusions
  • APPENDIX A.A Statistical Model for Condorcet Efficiency
  • APPENDIX B. Justification of the Shepsle Utility Function
  • APPENDIX C. Proofs of Theorems 5.1 and 5.2
  • APPENDIX D. Simulation Results for Approval Balloting with Alternative Decision Rules
  • APPENDIX E. Characterization of the Potentially Uniquely Optimal Strategies as Extreme Points of the Permissible Set of Strategies
  • APPENDIX F. Derivation of the Standard-Score Voting System
  • GLOSSARY
  • BIBLIOGRAPHY
  • INDEX
  • Backmatter

Ejemplares similares