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Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control
If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod-...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Princeton :
Princeton University Press,
2014.
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| Colección: | Book collections on Project MUSE.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
MARC
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| 020 | |a 9781400862436 | ||
| 020 | |z 9780691078373 | ||
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| 035 | |a (OCoLC)889252559 | ||
| 040 | |a MdBmJHUP |c MdBmJHUP | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Weber, Steve, |d 1961- | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control |
| 264 | 1 | |a Princeton : |b Princeton University Press, |c 2014. | |
| 264 | 3 | |a Baltimore, Md. : |b Project MUSE, |c 2015 | |
| 264 | 4 | |c ©2014. | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (350 pages). | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Princeton Legacy Library | |
| 500 | |a Cover; Contents. | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a List of Abbreviations ; Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. Current Approaches; 3. Cooperation: A New Approach; 4. Antiballistic Missile Systems; 5. Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles; 6. Antisatellite Weapons; 7. Conclusion; References; Index. | |
| 520 | |a If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod--Steve Weber argues that although nations employ many different types of strategies broadly consistent with game theory's ""tit for tat, "" only strategies based on an ideal type of ""enhanced contingent restraint"" promoted cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms control. As a theoretical analysis of the | ||
| 588 | |a Description based on print version record. | ||
| 650 | 7 | |a Strategic forces. |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst01134356 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Nuclear arms control. |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst01039881 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Game theory. |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst00937501 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a POLITICAL SCIENCE |x Government |x International. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a POLITICAL SCIENCE |x International Relations |x General. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Theorie des jeux. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Forces strategiques |z URSS. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Forces strategiques |z États-Unis. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Armes nucleaires |x Contrôle |z URSS. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Armes nucleaires |x Contrôle |z États-Unis. | |
| 650 | 2 | |a Game Theory | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Game theory. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Strategic forces |z Soviet Union. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Strategic forces |z United States. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Nuclear arms control |z Soviet Union. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Nuclear arms control |z United States. | |
| 651 | 7 | |a United States. |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst01204155 | |
| 651 | 7 | |a Soviet Union. |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst01210281 | |
| 655 | 7 | |a Electronic books. |2 local | |
| 710 | 2 | |a Project Muse. |e distributor | |
| 830 | 0 | |a Book collections on Project MUSE. | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |z Texto completo |u https://projectmuse.uam.elogim.com/book/34247/ |
| 945 | |a Project MUSE - Custom Collection | ||
| 945 | |a Project MUSE - Archive Complete Supplement III | ||
| 945 | |a Project MUSE - Archive History Supplement III | ||