Industry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies /

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Federal regulatory agencies are often assumed to be excessively responsive to and influenced by the corporate interests they are supposed to regulate. On the basis of direct empirical examination, Paul Quirk challenges this assumption as it relates to four United States federal regulatory agencies....

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Quirk, Paul J., 1949- (Autor)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, [1981]
Colección:Book collections on Project MUSE.
Temas:
Industrial policy.
Administrative agencies.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > American Government > General.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > Public Policy > Economic Policy.
Politique industrielle > États-Unis.
Administrative agencies > United States.
Industrial policy > United States.
United States.
Electronic books.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Frontmatter
  • Contents
  • List Of Tables
  • Preface
  • Chapter I. Introduction: The Problem of Industry Influence
  • Chapter II. Research Strategy: A Study of Policy Incentives
  • Chapter III. Policy Attitudes As Incentives: The Effects of Regulatory Appointments
  • Chapter IV. The Budgetary Incentive
  • Chapter V. Industry Jobs and The Career Incentive
  • Conclusions and Implications
  • Appendix A. List of Officials Interviewed
  • Appendix B The Interview Schedule
  • Appendix C. Comment On Coding
  • Notes
  • Bibliography
  • Index.

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