Mathematics and Democracy : Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures /

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Voters today often desert a preferred candidate for a more viable second choice to avoid wasting their vote. Likewise, parties to a dispute often find themselves unable to agree on a fair division of contested goods. In Mathematics and Democracy, Steven Brams, a leading authority in the use of mathe...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Brams, Steven J.
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 2008.
Colección:Book collections on Project MUSE.
Temas:
Wiskundige modellen.
Procedures.
Kiesstelsels.
Voting > Mathematical models.
Finance, Public > Mathematical models.
Elections > Mathematical models.
MATHEMATICS > Applied.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > Political Process > Elections.
Finances publiques > Modeles mathematiques.
Élections > Modeles mathematiques.
Vote > Modeles mathematiques.
Electronic books.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Electing a single winner : approval voting in practice
  • Electing a single winner : approval voting in theory
  • Electing a single winner : combining approval and preference
  • Electing multiple winners : constrained approval voting
  • Electing multiple winners : the minimax procedure
  • Electing multiple winners : minimizing misrepresentation
  • Selecting winners in multiple elections
  • Selecting a governing coalition in a parliament
  • Allocating cabinet ministries in a parliament
  • Allocating indivisible goods : help the worst-off or avoid envy?
  • Allocating a single homogeneous divisible good : divide-the-dollar
  • Allocating multiple homogeneous divisible goods : adjusted winner
  • Allocating a single heterogeneous good : cutting a cake
  • Allocating divisible and indivisible goods
  • Summary and conclusions.

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