Cargando…

Mere Possibilities : Metaphysical Foundations of Modal Semantics /

"It seems reasonable to believe that there might have existed things other than those that in fact exist, or have existed. But how should we understand such claims? Standard semantic theories exploit the Leibnizian metaphor of a set of all possible worlds: a proposition might or must be true if...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Stalnaker, Robert
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 2012.
Colección:Book collections on Project MUSE.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo

MARC

LEADER 00000cam a22000004a 4500
001 musev2_30528
003 MdBmJHUP
005 20230905043228.0
006 m o d
007 cr||||||||nn|n
008 111226s2012 nju o 00 0 eng d
020 |a 9781400842292 
020 |z 9780691147123 
035 |a (OCoLC)769343165 
040 |a MdBmJHUP  |c MdBmJHUP 
100 1 |a Stalnaker, Robert. 
245 1 0 |a Mere Possibilities :   |b Metaphysical Foundations of Modal Semantics /   |c Robert Stalnaker. 
264 1 |a Princeton, N.J. :  |b Princeton University Press,  |c 2012. 
264 3 |a Baltimore, Md. :  |b Project MUSE,   |c 2015 
264 4 |c ©2012. 
300 |a 1 online resource (184 pages). 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
490 0 |a Carl G. Hempel lecture series 
505 0 |a On what there isn't (but might have been) -- Merely possible possible worlds -- What is Haecceitism, and is it true? -- Disentangling semantics from metaphysics -- Modal realism, modal rationalism, modal naturalism -- Appendix A : modeling contingently existing propositions -- Appendix B : propositional functions and properties -- Appendix C : a model for a mighty language -- Appendix D : counterpart semantics for the cheap Haecceitist. 
520 |a "It seems reasonable to believe that there might have existed things other than those that in fact exist, or have existed. But how should we understand such claims? Standard semantic theories exploit the Leibnizian metaphor of a set of all possible worlds: a proposition might or must be true if it is true in some or all possible worlds. The actualist, who believes that nothing exists except what actually exists, prefers to talk of possible states of the world, or of ways that a world might be. But even the actualist still faces the problem of explaining what we are talking about when we talk about the domains of other possible worlds. In Mere Possibilities, Robert Stalnaker develops a framework for clarifying this problem, and explores a number of actualist strategies for solving it. Some philosophers have hypothesized a realm of individual essences that stand as proxies for all merely possible beings. Others have argued that we are committed to the necessary existence of everything that does or might exist. In contrast, Mere Possibilities shows how we can make sense of ordinary beliefs about what might and must exist without making counterintuitive metaphysical commitments. The book also sheds new light on the nature of metaphysical theorizing by exploring the interaction of semantic and metaphysical issues, the connections between different metaphysical issues, and the nature of ontological commitment."--Jacket. 
588 |a Description based on print version record. 
650 7 |a Possibility.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01072695 
650 7 |a Modality (Logic)  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01024350 
650 7 |a Metaphysics.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01018304 
650 7 |a First philosophy.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00925784 
650 7 |a PHILOSOPHY  |x Metaphysics.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a PHILOSOPHY  |x Logic.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a metaphysics.  |2 aat 
650 6 |a Metaphysique. 
650 6 |a Modalite (Logique) 
650 6 |a Possibilite. 
650 0 |a First philosophy. 
650 0 |a Metaphysics. 
650 0 |a Modality (Logic) 
650 0 |a Possibility. 
655 7 |a Electronic books.   |2 local 
710 2 |a Project Muse.  |e distributor 
830 0 |a Book collections on Project MUSE. 
856 4 0 |z Texto completo  |u https://projectmuse.uam.elogim.com/book/30528/ 
945 |a Project MUSE - Custom Collection 
945 |a Project MUSE - Archive Complete Supplement III 
945 |a Project MUSE - Archive Philosophy and Religion Supplement III