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Reasons without Rationalism /

Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apa...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Setiya, Kieran, 1976-
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 2007.
Colección:Book collections on Project MUSE.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo

MARC

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100 1 |a Setiya, Kieran,  |d 1976- 
245 1 0 |a Reasons without Rationalism /   |c Kieran Setiya. 
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264 4 |c ©2007. 
300 |a 1 online resource (131 pages). 
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505 0 |a "Squeezing the good into the right through the tubes of imperfection" -- The relevance of action theory -- A puzzle about intention -- The belief-desire model -- Acting for reasons -- Solving the puzzle -- A causal theory of action? -- Against the guise of the good -- Character and practical thought -- An argument for the virtue theory -- Practical reason and the guise of the good -- Motivation and desire -- Self-knowledge as the aim of action. 
520 |a Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is a fo. 
588 |a Description based on print version record. 
650 7 |a Virtue.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01167712 
650 7 |a Practical reason.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01074530 
650 7 |a Ethics.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00915833 
650 7 |a Act (Philosophy)  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00796122 
650 7 |a PHILOSOPHY  |x Ethics & Moral Philosophy.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a PHILOSOPHY  |x Social.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a ethics (philosophy)  |2 aat 
650 6 |a Raison pratique. 
650 6 |a Action (Philosophie) 
650 6 |a Vertus. 
650 6 |a Morale. 
650 0 |a Virtues. 
650 0 |a Practical reason. 
650 0 |a Act (Philosophy) 
650 0 |a Virtue. 
650 0 |a Ethics. 
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945 |a Project MUSE - Archive Philosophy and Religion Supplement III