Gatekeepers of Growth : The International Political Economy of Central Banking in Developing Countries /

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The book suggests that central bank independence in emerging market countries does not spring from law but rather from politics. As long as politicians value them, central banks will enjoy independence. Central banks are most likely to be independent in developing countries when politicians desire i...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Maxfield, Sylvia
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1997.
Colección:Book collections on Project MUSE.
Temas:
Economische politiek.
Centrale banken.
Zentralbanksystem
Notenbankpolitik
Banks and banking, Central.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Development > Economic Development.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Banks & Banking.
Banques centrales > Pays en voie de developpement.
Banks and banking, Central > Developing countries.
Entwicklungsländer
Developing countries.
Electronic books.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • 1. Central Bank Independence: Why the Interest?
  • 2. The Political Sources of Central Bank Independence
  • 3. International Capital Flows and the Politics of Central Bank Independence
  • 4. Central Bank Independence in the 1990s
  • 5. The Politics of Changing Central Bank Authority: Thailand
  • 6. The Politics of Changing Central Bank Authority: Mexico
  • 7. The Politics of Changing Central Bank Authority: South Korea
  • 8. The Politics of Changing Central Bank Authority: Brazil
  • 9. Conclusion.

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