Dishonesty in Behavioral Economics /

Dishonesty in Behavioral Economics provides a rigorous and comprehensive overview of dishonesty, presenting state-of-the-art research that adopts a behavioral economics perspective. Throughout the volume, contributors emphasize the effects of psychological, social, and cognitive factors on the decis...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Otros Autores: Bucciol, Alessan, Montinari, Natalia
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: London ; San Diego : Elsevier Ltd. : Academic Press, [2019]
Colección:Perspectives in behavioral economics and the economics of behavior.
Temas:
Economics > Psychological aspects.
Decision making > Psychological aspects.
Management.
Business ethics.
�Economie politique > Aspect psychologique.
Prise de d�ecision > Aspect psychologique.
Gestion.
Morale des affaires.
management.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Economics > General.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Reference.
Business ethics
Decision making > Psychological aspects
Economics > Psychological aspects
Management
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Economics > General
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Reference
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Front Cover
  • Dishonesty in Behavioral Economics
  • Copyright
  • Dedication
  • Contents
  • Contributors
  • Preface
  • Section 1: Dishonesty in behavioral economics: An overview
  • Chapter 1: Dishonesty in behavioral economics: An overview
  • 1 . Introduction
  • 2 . Dishonesty among children and young adults
  • 3 . Dishonesty, individual, and social preferences
  • 4 . Dishonesty in daily life
  • 5 . Further topics on dishonesty in behavioral economics
  • 6 . Concluding remarks
  • References
  • Section 2: Dishonesty among children and young adults
  • Chapter 2.1: Dishonesty in young children
  • 1 Common experimental approaches in developmental psychology
  • 2 Social and cognitive influences
  • 3 Dishonesty that can benefit others
  • 4 Dishonesty and distrust
  • 5 Future directions
  • 6 Summary
  • References
  • Chapter 2.2: Dishonesty among children: Rural/urban status and parental migration
  • 1 . Introduction
  • 2 . Related literature on moral development in children
  • 3 . Experimental design and procedure
  • 3.1 Subject pool and procedure
  • 3.2 Key measure of cheating vs honesty
  • 4 . Results
  • 4.1 Data overview and demographic differences across treatment groups
  • 4.2 Key results concerning dishonesty
  • 5 . Conclusions and discussion
  • Appendix: Experimental instructions and postexperiment questionnaire
  • A.1 Instructions and script
  • A.2 Compass game
  • A.2.1 Comprehension check
  • A.3 Smarties game
  • A.3.1 Comprehension check
  • A.4 Postexperiment questionnaire
  • References
  • Chapter 2.3: What does a young cheater look like? An innovative approach
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Experimental framework
  • 3. Analysis
  • 3.1 Linear analysis
  • 3.2 Nonlinear analysis
  • 4 Conclusion
  • Appendix. Questionnaire
  • References
  • Chapter 2.4: Dishonesty among university students
  • 1 . Introduction and related literature.
  • 2 . Data and summary statistics
  • 3 . Econometric analysis and results
  • 4 . Conclusion
  • Appendix. Online questionnaire f
  • References
  • Chapter 2.5: Cheating in academic exams: A field study
  • 1 . Introduction
  • 2 . Related literature
  • 2.1 Factors
  • 2.2 Self-reported cheating
  • 2.3 Attempts to reduce academic dishonesty
  • 3 . Research goals and method
  • 3.1 Constructs
  • 3.2 Experimental design
  • 4 . Three field experiments
  • 4.1 Experiment 1: attention vs attention and checkbox
  • 4.1.1 Design
  • 4.1.2 Hypotheses
  • 4.1.3 Results and discussion
  • 4.2 Experiment 2: Attention and checkbox vs attention and checkbox and warning
  • 4.2.1 Design
  • 4.2.2 Hypotheses
  • 4.2.3 Results and discussion
  • 4.3 Experiment 3: Attention and checkbox vs attention and checkbox and history
  • 4.3.1 Design
  • 4.3.2 Hypotheses
  • 4.3.3 Results and discussion
  • 5 . Spontaneous cheating vs planned cheating
  • 6 . Summary and conclusions
  • Appendix
  • References
  • Section 3: Dishonesty, individual, and social preferences
  • Chapter 3.1: Do economists lie more?
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Experimental design and procedures
  • 3. Results
  • 4. Conclusion
  • Appendix
  • References
  • Chapter 3.2: Cheating and altruism by discipline
  • 1 . Introduction
  • 2 . Experiment 1: Effects of cash penalties and altruism on cheating
  • 2.1 Method
  • 2.1.1 Participants
  • 2.1.2 Design and procedure
  • 2.2 Results
  • 2.2.1 Pure cheating with a chocolate truffle reward
  • 2.2.2 Cash penalties
  • 2.2.3 Altruism
  • 3 . Experiment 2: Effects of lying and altruistic donations
  • 3.1 Method
  • 3.1.1 Participants
  • 3.1.2 Design and procedure
  • 3.2 Results
  • 3.2.1 Pure cheating with a cash reward
  • 3.2.2 Altruism
  • 3.2.3 Lying behavior
  • 4 . Experiment 3A: Effects of pure altruism and lying behavior
  • 4.1 Method
  • 4.1.1 Participants.
  • 4.1.2 Design and procedure
  • 4.2 Results
  • 4.2.1 Altruism
  • 4.2.2 Lying behavior
  • 5 . Experiment 3B: Effects of prior notice on lying behavior
  • 5.1 Method
  • 5.1.1 Participants
  • 5.1.2 Design and procedure
  • 5.2 Results
  • 5.2.1 Altruism
  • 5.2.2 Lying behavior
  • 6 . Discussion and general conclusion
  • References
  • Chapter 3.3: Negative externalities of cheating: An experiment with charities
  • 1 . Introduction
  • 2 . Related literature
  • 3 . Experimental design
  • 4 . Experimental results
  • 5 . Conclusion
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • Chapter 3.4: Cheating: Perceptions and profit
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Literature review
  • 3. Experiment designh
  • 3.1 Procedures
  • 3.2 Design
  • 3.2.1 CONTROL treatment
  • 3.2.2 PREDICT treatment
  • 3.2.3 REPORT treatment
  • 3.2.4 Evaluation sessions
  • 3.3 Earnings in the die-roll experiment
  • 4. Model and hypotheses
  • 4.1 Model
  • 4.2 Hypotheses
  • 4.2.1 Self-image
  • 4.2.2 Definitions
  • 4.2.3 Statement of hypotheses
  • 5. Results
  • 5.1 Preferences for appearing honest and for being honest
  • 5.2 Structural estimation
  • 5.2.1 Choice space
  • 5.2.2 Perceptions of dishonesty
  • 5.2.3 Preference specification
  • 5.2.4 Results
  • 6. Discussion
  • Acknowledgment
  • References
  • Chapter 3.5: An experiment on conformity in deception
  • 1 . Introduction
  • 2 . Experimental design and analytical framework
  • 2.1 The deception game and the dictator dame
  • 2.2 Measuring conformity
  • 2.3 Hypotheses
  • 2.4 Experiment procedures
  • 3 . Results
  • 3.1 Lie aversion
  • 3.2 Conformity in deception
  • 3.3 Inequality aversion
  • 3.3.1 Inequality aversion in the control experiment
  • 3.3.2 Inequality aversion in the treatment experiments
  • 4 . Conclusions
  • Appendix Experiment instructions (translated from Japanese)
  • Instructions for Experiment 1 g
  • Your role.
  • [Instruction to the sender] Payoff number, payoff combination, and message
  • [Instructions for the receiver] checking the sender's message and reporting the number
  • [Instructions to both the sender and to the receiver] payoff allocations
  • Instruction for Experiment 2
  • Your role
  • [Instructions to the sender] allocating payoffs
  • [Instructions for the receiver] endorsing sender's allocation decision
  • [Instructions to both the sender and to the receiver] payoff allocations
  • Acknowledgement
  • References
  • Section 4: Dishonesty in daily life
  • Chapter 4.1: Fare-dodging in the lab and the moral cost of dishonesty
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Experimental design, procedures, and predictions
  • 2.1 Experimental design
  • 2.2 Conjectures
  • 2.3 Experimental procedures
  • 2.4 Identification of fraudsters
  • 3. Experimental results
  • 4. Discussion and conclusion
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • Chapter 4.2: The cost of being honest: Excessive change at the restaurant
  • 1 . Introduction
  • 2 . Method
  • 3 . Analysis and Results
  • 4 . Conclusion
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • Chapter 4.3: Prosociality and fiscal honesty: Tax evasion in Italy, United Kingdom, and Sweden
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 SVO survey: A new interpretation of the ordinal categories
  • 3 . The experiment: Design and procedure
  • 3.1 First three phases: The tax game
  • 3.2 Fourth phase: Social value orientation survey
  • 3.3 Fifth phase: The questionnaire
  • 4 . Experimental results
  • 4.1 The sample
  • 4.2 First question: Are prosocial people more compliant?
  • 5 Conclusions
  • Appendix
  • A.1 Advantages and Criticism of SVO Classification by Murphy et al. (2011)
  • A.2 Details of The Questionnaire
  • Funding
  • References
  • Chapter 4.4: Can upfront declarations of honesty improve anonymous self-reports of sensitive information?
  • 1 . Introduction.
  • 2 . Upfront declarations of honesty
  • 3 . Study 1: Healthy lifestyles
  • 3.1 Study 1a: Student survey
  • 3.1.1 Methods
  • 3.1.2 Results
  • 3.2 Study 1b: Online sample
  • 3.2.1 Methods
  • 3.2.2 Results
  • 4 . Study 2: On-campus littering
  • 4.1 Methods
  • 4.2 Results
  • 5 . Study 3: Petty corruption
  • 5.1 Methods
  • 5.2 Results
  • 6 . Discussion and conclusion
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • Index
  • Back Cover.

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