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The economics of screening and risk sharing in higher education : human capital formation, income inequality, and welfare /
The Economics of Screening and Risk Sharing in Higher Education explores advances in information technologies and in statistical and social sciences that have significantly improved the reliability of techniques for screening large populations. These advances are important for higher education world...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
London, UK :
Academic Press,
2015.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Front Cover; The Economics of Screening and Risk Sharing in Higher Education: Human Capital Formation, Income Inequality, and Welfare; Copyright; Contents; Preface; Chapter 1: Uncertainty and Screening: Preliminary Notions; 1.1 Information System; Favorableness Ordering of Signals: Good News and Bad News; 1.2 Real State and Signal Spaces; 1.3 Informativeness Orderings; 1.3.1 The Blackwell Criterion; Information and Welfare; Real State and Signal Spaces; 1.3.2 The Kim Criterion; 1.3.3 Uniform Signal Distribution ; Appendix to Chapter 1; Chapter 2: Screening Information in Equilibrium.
- 2.1 Value of Information in Exchange EconomiesNull Information; Full Information; A Generalization of the Hirshleifer Example; 2.2 Value of Information in Production Economies; 2.2.1 Complete Risk Sharing Arrangements; 2.2.1.1 Description of the Model; 2.2.1.2 Economic Welfare; 2.2.1.3 The Value of Information in the Absence of Risk Sharing; 2.2.1.4 The Value of Information with Complete Risk Sharing; 2.2.2 Incomplete Risk Sharing Arrangements; Information and Economic Welfare; 2.2.2.1 The Value of Information on the Nontradable Risk; 2.2.2.2 The Value of Information on the Tradable Risk.
- Appendix to Chapter 2Chapter 3: Evidence on Higher Education and Economic Performance; 3.1 Higher Education and Economic Development; 3.2 Higher Education and Income Inequality; 3.3 Income Inequality and Growth; 3.4 Credit Constraints in Higher Education; Chapter 4: Screening and Economic Growth; 4.1 Better Screening in a Dynamic Framework; 4.2 Description of the Framework; 4.3 Screening in the Absence of Risk Sharing; 4.4 Screening in the Presence of Risk Sharing; 4.5 Concluding Remarks; Appendix to Chapter 4; Chapter 5: Higher Education Financing.
- 5.1 Basic Framework with Multiple Funding Schemes5.1.1 Regime I: Unrestricted Access to Credit Markets; 5.1.2 Regime II: Unrestricted Insurance of Loans; 5.1.3 Regime III: Restricted Insurance of Loans; 5.1.4 Remarks on the Implementation of the Regimes; 5.2 Human Capital Accumulation; 5.3 Welfare Comparison; 5.4 The Effect of Better Screening; 5.4.1 Screening and Human Capital Formation; 5.4.2 Screening and Welfare; Appendix to Chapter 5; Chapter 6: The Role of Government in Financing Higher Education; 6.1 Subsidizing Tuition Versus Subsidizing Student Loans; 6.1.1 The Model.
- 6.1.1.1 The Social Investment Optimum6.1.1.2 Individual Behavior and Equilibrium; 6.1.2 Exogenous Subsidization Policies; 6.1.2.1 Subsidizing Student Loans (SL-Subsidy); 6.1.2.2 Subsidizing Tuition Fees (T-Subsidy); 6.1.2.3 Comparing the Subsidization Policies; 6.1.3 Endogenous Subsidization Policies; 6.1.4 Tax-Deductible Investment; 6.1.5 Policy Implications; 6.2 Should Diverse Funding Schemes Coexist in Higher Education?; 6.2.1 The Model; Funding Structure and Individual Behavior; 6.2.1.1 Credit Funding Equilibrium (CRE); 6.2.1.2 Equilibrium with Funding Diversity (FDE).