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Game theory and applications /
Game Theory and Applications outlines game theory and proves its validity by examining it alongside the neoclassical paradigm. This book contends that the neoclassical theory is the exceptional case, and that game theory may indeed be the rule. The papers and abstracts collected here explore its rec...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor Corporativo: | |
| Otros Autores: | , , |
| Formato: | Electrónico Congresos, conferencias eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
San Diego :
Academic Press,
[1990]
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| Colección: | Economic theory, econometrics, and mathematical economics.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Front Cover; Game Theory and Applications; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; Contributors; Preface; Chapter 1. Refinement of Nash Equilibrium: The Main Ideas; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. BACKWARD INDUCTION AND FORWARD INDUCTION; 3. INFORMAL APPLICATIONS; 4. THE PROBLEM OF INCONSISTENCY; 5. THE EXISTENCE THEOREM: VERSION I; 6. FORMAL APPLICATIONS; 7. CONSISTENCY OF BELIEFS; 8. ADMISSIBILITY; 9. RESTRICTIONS ON OUT-OF-EQUILIBRIUM BELIEFS; 10. ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES
- 11. DEDUCTIONS BEYOND IIA; 12. CONCLUDING REMARKS; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; APPENDIX A; APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 3.
- 3. SOME REMARKS ABOUT THE GENERAL MODELREFERENCES; Chapter 5. Bounded Rationality and Strategic Complexity in Repeated Games; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. DESCRIPTION OF STRATEGIC GAMES; 3. DESCRIPTION OF REPEATED GAMES; 4. AUTOMATA AND COMPLEXITY MEASURES IN REPEATED GAMES; 5. GAMES WITH RESTRICTED PLAYERS; 6. COMPLEXITY CHOICES OF UNRESTRICTED PLAYERS; 7. CONCLUDING REMARKS; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; BIBLIOGRAPHY; The Shapley Value; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; REFERENCES; Chapter 6. Advances in Value Theory; 1. FINITE GAMES WITH TRANSFERABLE UTILITY; 2. FINITE GAMES WITH NONTRANSFERABLE UTILITY.
- 3. LARGE GAMES WITH TRANSFERABLE UTILITY4. LARGE GAMES WITH NONTRANSFERABLE UTILITY; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; REFERENCES; Chapter 7. Axiomatizations of the Core, the Nucleolus, and the Prekernel; 1. COALITIONAL GAMES WITH TRANSFERABLE UTILITY; 2. COALITIONAL GAMES WITHOUT SlDE PAYMENTS; REFERENCES; Chapter 8. Consistency; REFERENCES; Chapter 9. The Consistency Principle; 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION; 2. THE CONSISTENCY PRINCIPLE; 3. APPLICATIONS; 4. CONCLUDING COMMENTS; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; REFERENCES; Chapter 10. Discrete Concepts in n-Person Game Theory: Nondegeneracy and Homogeneity; 1. INTRODUCTION.
- 2. NOTATION3. EXAMPLES; 4. NONDEGENERACY AND HOMOGENEITY; 6. THE WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM AND THE CORE IN A TRANSFERABLE UTILITY MARKET(TU MARKET); REFERENCES; Chapter 11. Two-Sided Matching Markets: An Overview of Some Theory and Empirical Evidence; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. THE LABOR MARKET FOR AMERICAN MEDICAL INTERNS; 3. A MODEL OF THEHOSPITAL-INTERN MARKET; 4. STABILITY AND STRATEGY; 5. THE DETAILED STRUCTURE OF THE SET OF STABLE MATCHINGS; 6. DISCUSSION; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; REFERENCES; Chapter 12. Strategie Market Game Models of Exchange Economies; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. MARKETS WITH A SINGLE MONEY.