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SCIDIR_ocn893678893 |
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20231120111828.0 |
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cr cnu---unuuu |
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141024s1990 caua ob 101 0 eng d |
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|a 1483295052
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|a Game theory and applications /
|c edited by Tatsuro Ichiishi, Abraham Neyman, Yair Tauman.
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1 |
|a San Diego :
|b Academic Press,
|c [1990]
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264 |
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4 |
|c �1990
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300 |
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|a 1 online resource (xi, 435 pages) :
|b illustrations
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|a text
|b txt
|2 rdacontent
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|a computer
|b c
|2 rdamedia
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|a online resource
|b cr
|2 rdacarrier
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|a Economic theory, econometrics, and mathematical economics
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588 |
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|a Print version record.
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|a "Based on presentations at the International Conference on Game Theory and Applications held at the Ohio State University, June 18-24, 1987"--Preface
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|a Includes bibliographical references and index.
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|a Game Theory and Applications outlines game theory and proves its validity by examining it alongside the neoclassical paradigm. This book contends that the neoclassical theory is the exceptional case, and that game theory may indeed be the rule. The papers and abstracts collected here explore its recent development and suggest new research directions.
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|a Front Cover; Game Theory and Applications; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; Contributors; Preface; Chapter 1. Refinement of Nash Equilibrium: The Main Ideas; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. BACKWARD INDUCTION AND FORWARD INDUCTION; 3. INFORMAL APPLICATIONS; 4. THE PROBLEM OF INCONSISTENCY; 5. THE EXISTENCE THEOREM: VERSION I; 6. FORMAL APPLICATIONS; 7. CONSISTENCY OF BELIEFS; 8. ADMISSIBILITY; 9. RESTRICTIONS ON OUT-OF-EQUILIBRIUM BELIEFS; 10. ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES -- 11. DEDUCTIONS BEYOND IIA; 12. CONCLUDING REMARKS; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; APPENDIX A; APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 3.
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|a 3. SOME REMARKS ABOUT THE GENERAL MODELREFERENCES; Chapter 5. Bounded Rationality and Strategic Complexity in Repeated Games; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. DESCRIPTION OF STRATEGIC GAMES; 3. DESCRIPTION OF REPEATED GAMES; 4. AUTOMATA AND COMPLEXITY MEASURES IN REPEATED GAMES; 5. GAMES WITH RESTRICTED PLAYERS; 6. COMPLEXITY CHOICES OF UNRESTRICTED PLAYERS; 7. CONCLUDING REMARKS; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; BIBLIOGRAPHY; The Shapley Value; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; REFERENCES; Chapter 6. Advances in Value Theory; 1. FINITE GAMES WITH TRANSFERABLE UTILITY; 2. FINITE GAMES WITH NONTRANSFERABLE UTILITY.
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|a 3. LARGE GAMES WITH TRANSFERABLE UTILITY4. LARGE GAMES WITH NONTRANSFERABLE UTILITY; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; REFERENCES; Chapter 7. Axiomatizations of the Core, the Nucleolus, and the Prekernel; 1. COALITIONAL GAMES WITH TRANSFERABLE UTILITY; 2. COALITIONAL GAMES WITHOUT SlDE PAYMENTS; REFERENCES; Chapter 8. Consistency; REFERENCES; Chapter 9. The Consistency Principle; 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION; 2. THE CONSISTENCY PRINCIPLE; 3. APPLICATIONS; 4. CONCLUDING COMMENTS; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; REFERENCES; Chapter 10. Discrete Concepts in n-Person Game Theory: Nondegeneracy and Homogeneity; 1. INTRODUCTION.
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|a 2. NOTATION3. EXAMPLES; 4. NONDEGENERACY AND HOMOGENEITY; 6. THE WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM AND THE CORE IN A TRANSFERABLE UTILITY MARKET(TU MARKET); REFERENCES; Chapter 11. Two-Sided Matching Markets: An Overview of Some Theory and Empirical Evidence; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. THE LABOR MARKET FOR AMERICAN MEDICAL INTERNS; 3. A MODEL OF THEHOSPITAL-INTERN MARKET; 4. STABILITY AND STRATEGY; 5. THE DETAILED STRUCTURE OF THE SET OF STABLE MATCHINGS; 6. DISCUSSION; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; REFERENCES; Chapter 12. Strategie Market Game Models of Exchange Economies; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. MARKETS WITH A SINGLE MONEY.
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546 |
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|a English.
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650 |
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0 |
|a Game theory.
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650 |
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2 |
|a Game Theory
|0 (DNLM)D005716
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650 |
|
6 |
|a Th�eorie des jeux.
|0 (CaQQLa)201-0007580
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a MATHEMATICS
|x Applied.
|2 bisacsh
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650 |
|
7 |
|a MATHEMATICS
|x Probability & Statistics
|x General.
|2 bisacsh
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Game theory
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst00937501
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Spieltheorie
|2 gnd
|0 (DE-588)4056243-8
|
650 |
1 |
7 |
|a Kwantitatieve methoden.
|2 gtt
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650 |
1 |
7 |
|a Speltheorie.
|2 gtt
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650 |
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7 |
|a Th�eorie des jeux.
|2 ram
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655 |
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2 |
|a Congress
|0 (DNLM)D016423
|
655 |
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7 |
|a proceedings (reports)
|2 aat
|0 (CStmoGRI)aatgf300027316
|
655 |
|
7 |
|a Conference papers and proceedings
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst01423772
|
655 |
|
7 |
|a Conference papers and proceedings.
|2 lcgft
|
655 |
|
7 |
|a Actes de congr�es.
|2 rvmgf
|0 (CaQQLa)RVMGF-000001049
|
700 |
1 |
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|a Ichiishi, Tatsuro,
|e editor.
|
700 |
1 |
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|a Neyman, Abraham,
|e editor.
|
700 |
1 |
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|a Tauman, Yair,
|e editor.
|
711 |
2 |
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|a International Conference on Game Theory and Applications
|d (1987 :
|c Ohio State University)
|
776 |
0 |
8 |
|i Print version:
|t Game theory and applications
|z 0123701821
|w (DLC) 90030648
|w (OCoLC)21041355
|
830 |
|
0 |
|a Economic theory, econometrics, and mathematical economics.
|
856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://sciencedirect.uam.elogim.com/science/book/9780123701824
|z Texto completo
|