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Formal theories of politics : mathematical modelling in political science /
Formal Theories of Politics demonstrates the role of formal mathematical models in political science, and aims to convey a sense of the questions and methods which govern the political science research agenda. While there is still much interest in empirical patterns of voting behaviour and public op...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Otros Autores: | , |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Oxford ; New York :
Pergamon Press,
[1989]
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| Colección: | International series in modern applied mathematics and computer science ;
v. 20. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Front Cover; Pergamon Titles of Related Interest; Formal Theories of Politics: Mathematical Modelling in Political Science; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; EDITORIAL FOREWORD; FORMAL THEORIES OF POLITICS: THE SCOPE OF MATHEMATICAL MODELLING IN POLITICAL SCIENCE; A BRIEF HISTORY OF MODELS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE; ABOUT THE ARTICLES; CONCLUSION; REFERENCES; PART 1: MULTIDIMENSIONAL MODELS OFLEGISLATIVE DECISION; CHAPTER 1. LIMITS ON AGENDA CONTROL INSPATIAL VOTING GAMES; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. AGENDA CONTROL; 3. MAJORITY RULE IN SPATIAL VOTING GAMES; 4. AGENDA PROPOSITIONS; 5. CONCLUSIONS.
- THE CASE OF SYMMETRIC f(x) AND POLITICAL PARTIESDISCUSSION; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 4. UNDOMINATED CANDIDATE STRATEGIES UNDER ALTERNATIVE VOTING RULES; INTRODUCTION; VOTING METHODS; CANDIDATE STRATEGIES; RESULTS; CONCLUSION; REFERENCES; APPENDIX; CHAPTER 5. THE LOCATION OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES: AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF A NEW SPATIAL MODEL OF ELECTIONS INTRODUCTION; AN APPROPRIATE METHODOLOGY FOR TESTING SPATIAL THEORY; SCALING THE CANDIDATES IN THE 1980 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION; ADDING THE VOTERS TO THE SPACE; A PROBABILISTIC EQUILIBRIUM FOR THE CANDIDATES; CONCLUSION; REFERENCES.
- Chapter 6. a model of candidate convergence under uncertainty about voter preferences1. introduction; 2. the optimality of a tweedle-dum response to tweedle-dee; 3. the challenger's optimal direction and the incumbent's optimal position; 4. the pareto optimality of the incumbent's location; references; chapter 7. reputational dynamics in spatial competition; 1. introduction; 2. the reputation model; 3. incumbent-challenger equilibrium; 4. reputational dynamics in spatial competition-overview; 5. the evolution of positions and electoral probabilities over time; 6. summary; references; appendix.
- Part 3: game and decision theorychapter 8. political decision making with costly and imperfect information; 1. introduction; 2. the model; 3. uniqueness of the solution to the functional equation; 4. the effects of risk and information costs; 5. conclusions; references; appendix; chapter 9. advantageous multiple rent seeking; 1. introduction; 2. the model; 3. equilibrium analysis; 4. an extension: heterogeneous objects; 5. summary; references; chapter 10. the geographical imperatives of the balance of power in 3-country systems; 1. introduction; 2. an initial model; 3. incorporating geography.