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Sustainable economic development : resources, environment, and institutions /
Sustainable Economic Development: Resources, Environment, and Institutions presents 25 articles that lay the foundations of sustainable development in a way that facilitates effective policy design. The editors mix broad thematic papers with focused micro-papers, balancing theories with policy desig...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Otros Autores: | , , |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Amsterdam :
Elsevier,
2014.
|
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Front Cover
- Sustainable Economic Development
- Copyright Page
- Dedication
- Contents
- About the Editors
- About the Authors
- Foreword
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction and Synthesis
- 1 The Principles and Practice of Sustainable Economic Development: Overview and Synthesis
- 1.1 Introduction
- 1.2 Resource Management and Sustainable Development
- 1.3 Institutions, Governance, and Political Economy
- 1.4 The Nature, Causes, and Consequences of Agricultural Development Policy
- 1.5 Development, Vulnerability, and Poverty Reduction
- 1.6 Conclusion
- References
- 2 Reflections on the Foundations of Development Policy Analysis
- 2.1 Introduction
- 2.1.1 The Four Stages of Research in Development Economics
- 2.1.2 The Nature-Causes-Consequences Paradigm for Development Policy Analysis
- 2.2 Behavioral Foundations for Agricultural Development Policy
- 2.2.1 Toward Fundamental Explanations of Farm-Household Behavior
- 2.2.2 Modern Trends in Empirical Analysis
- 2.3 Organizational Foundations for Development Policy Analysis: The New Institutional Economics
- 2.3.1 Examples of Nonfundamental Explanations
- 2.3.2 From the Coase Theorem to Fundamental Explanations of Agrarian Contracts
- 2.3.3 Assumptions, Levels of Analysis, and Categorical Versus Noncategorical Theories
- 2.3.4 Toward a Unified Version of the New Institutional Economics
- 2.3.5 More on Big Versus Small Farms
- 2.3.6 The Economics of the Third-Best: A Constitutional Approach to Governing Rent-Seeking
- 2.4 Modern Theories of Market and Institutional Failure: Shocks, Traps, Nets, and Ladders
- 2.5 The Anatomy of Specialization
- 2.6 Black-Hole Economics
- 2.6.1 Prohibition of Alcohol and Drugs
- 2.6.2 Illegal Immigration
- 2.6.3 Abortion and Prostitution
- 2.6.4 Bans and Subsidies: Parastatals, Renewable Energy, and Sustainability.
- 6.2 Groundwater-Kiawe Management Framework
- 6.2.1 Groundwater Dynamics
- 6.2.2 Kiawe Dynamics
- 6.2.3 PV Maximization
- 6.2.4 The Optimal Steady State
- 6.3 An Application to the Kona Coast of Hawai'i
- 6.3.1 Hydrology
- 6.3.2 Groundwater Extraction and Desalination Costs
- 6.3.3 Demand for Water
- 6.3.4 Groundwater Uptake by Kiawe
- 6.3.5 Kiawe Removal Costs
- 6.4 Results
- 6.5 Conclusion
- Acknowledgments
- References
- Appendix
- 7 Win-Win Solutions for Reforestation and Maize Farming: A Case Study of Nan, Thailand
- 7.1 Introduction
- 7.2 Maize Farming in Nan Province
- 7.3 Value of Community Forest Products
- 7.4 Farmers' Incentive to Convert Forest to Maize Farm
- 7.4.1 Perfect Foresight View
- 7.4.2 Shortsighted View
- 7.4.2.1 Myopia
- 7.4.2.2 Financial constraints
- 7.5 Limitations of Current Government Policies
- 7.6 Alternative Win-Win Policies
- 7.6.1 Green Subsidy
- 7.6.2 Irrigation
- 7.7 Conclusion
- References
- 3 Institutions, Governance, and Political Economy
- 8 The Role of Institutions in Natural Resource Use
- 8.1 Introduction
- 8.2 Institution, Resource Use, and Resource Scarcity: Debates in the Literature
- 8.2.1 Game Theory Studies on Common Property Resource Management
- 8.2.2 Effects of Trade on Resource Use in a Resource-Abundant Economy
- 8.3 Optimal Institutions Given the Cost of Institutional Change
- 8.3.1 Steady State Analysis
- 8.3.2 Institutional Change on the Transition Path
- 8.4 Institutional Choice in Equilibrium
- 8.5 Research Opportunities on Resource Governance
- 8.5.1 Transitions Across Different Forms of Institutions
- 8.5.2 General Equilibrium Effects
- 8.5.3 The Role of Government and Its Interaction with Resource Users
- 8.5.4 Institutions and Economic Development
- Acknowledgments
- References
- 9 Public Choice and the Generalized Resource Curse.
- 9.1 Introduction
- 9.2 Other Boom Sources
- 9.3 Mechanisms by Which Abundance Can Become a Curse
- 9.3.1 Crowding Out Manufacturing
- 9.3.2 Political Economy Curses: Distortionary Tariffs and the Transmission Effect
- 9.4 Modeling the Curse of Abundance
- 9.4.1 The Three-Sector Australian Model
- 9.4.1.1 Crowding out of manufactured importables
- 9.4.1.2 Distortionary tariff after the boom
- 9.4.2 The Augmented Dutch Disease: The Four-Sector Model
- 9.4.2.1 Crowding out of manufactured exportables
- 9.4.2.2 Distortionary tariff and the distribution of gains and losses
- 9.5 Rent-Seeking Effects on Public Policies
- 9.5.1 Modeling Rent-Seeking and the Political Economy Effects of the Boom
- 9.5.2 Learning by Lobbying
- 9.6 All That Curses Is Not Gold: Implication for the Philippines
- 9.7 Conclusion
- Acknowledgments
- References
- 10 Governing Commercial Agriculture in Africa: The Challenges of Coordinating Investments and Selecting Investors
- 10.1 Introduction
- 10.2 Capturing the Productivity Growth Potential Through Commercial Agriculture
- 10.2.1 Small Versus Large Farms?
- 10.2.2 The Challenges of Governing Large-Scale Commercial Farming
- 10.3 Coordinating Investments and Selecting Investors for Better Governance of Commercial Agriculture
- 10.3.1 Coordinating Investments and Selecting Investors for "Value" Discovery
- 10.3.2 Institutional Arrangements for Public and Private Coordination
- 10.3.3 Presidential Investor Advisory Councils
- 10.3.4 Industry-level Public-Private DIALOGUE and Coordination
- 10.3.5 Coordinating Public-Private Investments Within Spatial Development Plans
- 10.4 Coordinating with Communities and Local Stakeholders in Governing Commercial Agriculture
- 10.5 Governance Beyond Governments
- 10.5.1 Voluntary Industry Standards.
- 10.5.2 Civil Society Organizations and Standards for Transparency and Good Governance
- 10.5.3 International Development Institutions
- 10.6 Conclusion
- References
- 11 Land Confiscations and Land Reform in Natural-Order States
- 11.1 Introduction
- 11.2 Confiscations in Early Modern Europe and Its Offshoots
- 11.2.1 Confiscations of Church Lands by Established Governments
- 11.2.1.1 Henry VIII's monastic confiscations
- 11.2.1.2 Joseph II's monastic confiscations
- 11.2.2 Confiscation of Lands by Revolutionary Parliaments
- 11.2.2.1 The interregnum confiscations in Great Britain
- 11.2.2.2 The loyalist confiscations in North America
- 11.2.2.3 Confiscations during the early French revolution
- 11.2.2.4 Confiscations by ruling chiefs in Hawai'i
- 11.3 Origins of Early Modern Confiscations
- 11.4 Redistribution and Sale of Confiscated Lands
- 11.5 Conclusion
- Acknowledgments
- References
- 12 Regional Integration and Illicit Economy in Fragile Nations: Perspectives from Afghanistan and Myanmar
- 12.1 Economic Framework for Illicit Activities and Its Cross-Border Context
- 12.2 Afghanistan
- 12.3 Myanmar
- 12.4 A Way Forward for Policy Analysis
- References
- Appendix: Notes on Harmful Drugs
- 13 Corruption, Transactions Costs, and Network Relationships: Governance Challenges for Thailand
- 13.1 Introduction
- 13.2 The Setting: Political and Administrative Reforms and the Asian Economic Crisis
- 13.3 Network Relationships, Transactions Costs, and Corruption
- 13.3.1 Connected Dealings: Cases from Thailand
- 13.4 Reducing Connected Dealings and Improving Procurement in Thailand
- 13.4.1 Improving the Legal Infrastructure
- 13.4.2 Targeting Corruption-Friendly Economic Policies
- 13.4.3 Upgrading of the Database
- 13.4.4 Increased Social Mobilization for Enhanced Transparency
- 13.5 Conclusion
- References.