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Game theory : mathematical models of conflict /

"This book balances a light touch with a rigorous yet economical account of the theory of games and bargaining models. It provides a precise interpretation, discussion and mathematical analysis for a wide range of "game-like" problems in economics, sociology, strategic studies and war...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Jones, A. J. (Antonia Jane), 1943-
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Chichester [England] : Horwood Pub., 2000.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo

MARC

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100 1 |a Jones, A. J.  |q (Antonia Jane),  |d 1943- 
245 1 0 |a Game theory :  |b mathematical models of conflict /  |c A.J. Jones. 
264 1 |a Chichester [England] :  |b Horwood Pub.,  |c 2000. 
300 |a 1 online resource (xiv, 286 pages) :  |b illustrations 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references and index. 
505 0 0 |t The name of the game --  |t Extensive Forms And Pure Strategies --  |t Normal Forms And Saddle Points --  |t Mixed Strategies And The Minimax Theorem --  |t Dominance Of Strategies --  |t 2 x n And Symmetric Games --  |t Other Kinds Of Two Person Zero Sum Games --  |t Non-cooperative Games --  |t Extensive Forms And Equilibrium N-Tuples --  |t Normal Forms And Mixed Strategy Equlibria --  |t Discussion Of Equilibria --  |t Preliminary Results For 2-Person Zero Sum Games --  |t The Minimax Theorem For Matrix Games --  |t Properties Of Matrix Games --  |t Simplified 2-Person Poker --  |t Continuous Games On The Unit Square --  |t Linear Programming and Matrix Games --  |t Preliminary Results --  |t Duality Theory --  |t The Geometric Situation --  |t Extreme Points Of The Feasible Region --  |t The Shapley-Snow Procedure For Games --  |t Mixed Constraints, Slack Variables, And The Tableau --  |t The Pivot Operation --  |t Artificial Variables --  |t Cooperative games --  |t Utilities And Scales Of Measurement --  |t Characteristic Functions --  |t Imputations --  |t Strategic Equivalence --  |t Dominance Of Imputations --  |t von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions --  |t The Edgeworth Trading Model --  |t The Shapley Value --  |t Bargaining Models --  |t Graphical Representation Of Games And Status Quo Points --  |t The Nash Bargaining Model --  |t The Threat Game --  |t Shapley And Nash Solutions For Bimatrix Games --  |t Other Bargaining Models --  |t Fixed Point Theorems. 
520 1 |a "This book balances a light touch with a rigorous yet economical account of the theory of games and bargaining models. It provides a precise interpretation, discussion and mathematical analysis for a wide range of "game-like" problems in economics, sociology, strategic studies and war." "There is first an informal introduction to game theory, which can be understood by non-mathematicians, which covers the basic ideas of extensive form, pure and mixed strategies and the minimax theorem. The general theory of non-cooperative games is then given a detailed mathematical treatment in the second chapter. Next follows a "first class" account of linear programming, theory and practice, terse, rigorous and readable, which is applied as a tool to matrix games and economics from duality theory via the equilibrium theorem, with detailed explanations of computational aspects of the simplex algorithm." "The remaining chapters give an unusually comprehensive but concise treatment of cooperative games, an original account of bargaining models, with a skillfully guided tour through the Shapley and Nash solutions for bimatrix games and a carefully illustrated account of finding the best threat strategies."--Jacket 
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650 7 |a Game theory  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00937501 
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776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a Jones, A.J. (Antonia Jane), 1943-  |t Game theory  |z 1898563144  |w (DLC) 00708779  |w (OCoLC)44654208 
856 4 0 |u https://sciencedirect.uam.elogim.com/science/book/9781898563143  |z Texto completo