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Financial whirlpools : a systems story of the great global recession /

"How do economists reconcile their expertise with their failures to predict and manage the 2008 financial crisis? This book goes a long way toward an answer by using systems theory to reveal the complex interdependence of factors and forces behind the crisis. In her fully integrated view of the...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Higgins, Karen L.
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Kidlington, Oxford, UK : Academic Press, �2013.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • pt. 1. Foundations
  • pt. 2. The yin: human behaviors
  • pt. 3. The yang: economic mechanisms
  • pt. 4. Yin and yang: integration.
  • Machine generated contents note: pt. I Foundations
  • 1. Lines or Circles: The Basics of Systems Thinking
  • 1.1.A Brief History of Systems Thinking
  • 1.2. Application and Relevance of Systems Thinking
  • 1.3. Linear Thinking and Systems Thinking
  • 1.4.Complexity Economics and Systems Thinking
  • 1.5. Systems Thinking Concepts
  • 1.6. Loops
  • 1.6.1. Feedback Processes
  • 1.6.1.1. Reinforcing Feedback
  • 1.6.1.2. Balancing Feedback
  • 1.6.2. Feed-Forward Processes
  • 1.7. Lags: Time Delays
  • 1.8. Limits to Growth
  • 1.8.1.S-Shaped Growth
  • 1.8.2. Overshoot and Col lapse
  • 1.9. Levers: Points of Power
  • 1.10. Visualization Tools
  • 1.10.1. Behavior-over-Time Graphs
  • 1.10.2. Causal Loop Diagrams
  • 1.10.3. Balancing Feedback Loop
  • 1.10.4. Balancing Feedback Loop with Delays
  • 1.10.5. Reinforcing Feedback and Feed-Forward Loops
  • 1.10.6. Limits to Growth
  • 1.10.6.1.S-Shaped Growth
  • 1.10.6.2. Overshoot and Collapse
  • 1.11. System Boundaries
  • 1.12. Systems Thinking Philosophy
  • 1.13. Summary
  • 2. As the Gears Turn: Policies, Practices, Markets, and Risk
  • 2.1. Timeline
  • 2.2. Federal Economic Policies
  • 2.2.1. Monetary Policy
  • 2.2.1.1. Interest Rates
  • 2.2.1.2. Inflation Targets
  • 2.2.1.3. Delays and Other Forces
  • 2.2.2. Housing Policies
  • 2.3. Home Mortgage Lending Practices
  • 2.3.1. Lending Strategies
  • 2.3.1.1. Relaxed Standards
  • 2.3.1.2. More Loans to Higher-Risk Borrowers
  • 2.3.2. Types of Loans
  • 2.4. Markets and Human Behavior
  • 2.5. Housing Market
  • 2.6. Financial Market
  • 2.6.1. Securitization: Mortgage-Backed Securities
  • 2.6.2. Structuring: Collateralized Debt Obligations
  • 2.6.3. Derivatives: Credit Default Swaps
  • 2.7. Risk
  • 2.8. Systems Interpretation
  • 2.8.1. Balancing Loop for Monetary Policy
  • 2.8.2. Balancing Loops for Housing Supply and Demand
  • 2.8.3. Influence of the Housing Market on Securities and Derivatives
  • 2.8.4. Candidate Leverage Points
  • 2.8.5. Current Activities
  • 2.8.6. Cautions
  • 2.9. Summary
  • pt. II The Yin: Human Behaviors
  • 3. Where Can I Buy One? Humans and the Economy
  • 3.1. History of Human Psychology in Economic Theory
  • 3.1.1. Behavioral Economics
  • 3.1.2. Neuroeconomics
  • 3.2. The Role of Values and Beliefs in Economics
  • 3.3. The Role of Expectations in Economics
  • 3.4. The Role of Human Nature in Economics
  • 3.5. Summary
  • 4. Who Are You Anyway? Values, Beliefs, Norms, and Behaviors
  • 4.1. American Culture
  • 4.1.1. Value Patterns
  • 4.1.1.1. Entitlement to Success
  • 4.1.1.2. Entitlement to Material Comfort
  • 4.1.1.3. Entitlement to Equality
  • 4.1.1.4. Entitlement to Property
  • 4.1.2. Beliefs
  • 4.1.2.1. The American Dream
  • 4.1.2.2. Consumeritis
  • 4.1.2.3. Consumer Credit is Mine
  • 4.2. Corporate Cultures
  • 4.3. Systems Thinking Interpretation
  • 4.3.1. Candidate Leverage Points
  • 4.3.1.1. Alternate Beliefs
  • 4.3.1.2. Leaders' Influence on Corporate Culture
  • 4.3.2. Current Activities
  • 4.4. Summary
  • 5. Visions of Grandeur: Expectations and Behaviors
  • 5.1. Expectations and the Economic Environment
  • 5.1.1. Confidence Levels
  • 5.1.2. Effects of the Environment on Expectations
  • 5.1.3. Environment before the Crisis
  • 5.1.4. Expectations before the Crisis
  • 5.1.4.1. Expectation One: Current Economic Conditions Will Continue Indefinitely
  • 5.1.4.2. Expectation Two: Housing Prices are Rising so I'd Better Buy Now
  • 5.1.4.3. Expectation Three: My Financial Security is Permanent, so I Can Afford to Spend Money
  • 5.1.4.4. Expectation Four: Because Others are Doing it, it Must Be Good, so I Will Do it Too
  • 5.1.4.5. Expectation Five: My Success Will Continue because I'm Good and I'm Lucky
  • 5.1.4.6. Expectation Six: I'll Be Able to Manage My Loan Payments Even Better in the Future
  • 5.1.4.7. Expectation Seven (for mortgage lenders and sellers of mortgage-related securities): Borrowers Will Not Default on Home Loans
  • 5.2. Systems Thinking Interpretation
  • 5.2.1. Expectation Reinforcing Feed-Forward Loop
  • 5.2.2. Demand Reinforcing Feedback Loop
  • 5.2.3. Candidate Leverage Points
  • 5.2.3.1. Demand Leverage
  • 5.2.3.2. Expectations Leverage
  • 5.2.4. Current Activities
  • 5.3. Summary
  • 6.A Crisis of Human Proportions: Ethics and Behaviors
  • 6.1. Mortgage Fraud
  • 6.1.1. Fraud for Housing
  • 6.1.2. Fraud for Profit
  • 6.2. Disreputable Lending
  • 6.2.1. Misleading Loan Descriptions
  • 6.2.2. Liar Loans
  • 6.3. Shady Corporate Strategy
  • 6.3.1. Lofty Goals
  • 6.3.2. Devious Tactics and Tantalizing Incentives
  • 6.4. Deceitful Dealings
  • 6.4.1. Corporate Fraud
  • 6.4.2. Securities Fraud
  • 6.4.2.1. Inappropriate Ratings
  • 6.4.2.2. Collusion for Volume
  • 6.4.2.3. Poor and Misleading Information
  • 6.4.3. Ego-Driven Behaviors
  • 6.5. Systems Thinking Interpretation
  • 6.6. Summary
  • 7. Self Speaks Loudly and Carries a Big Stick: Sources of Unethical Behavior.
  • 7.1. Ethics and Its Purpose
  • 7.2. Ethical Issue: Self-Interest Versus Social Interest
  • 7.3. Human Nature Traits of Self-Interest
  • 7.3.1. Survival
  • 7.3.2. Significance
  • 7.3.3. Belonging
  • 7.3.4. Pleasure
  • 7.4. Societal Needs
  • 7.5. Economic Environment
  • 7.6. Repositories of Moral Grounding
  • 7.6.1. Moral Values
  • 7.6.2. American Culture
  • 7.6.3. Corporate Cultures
  • 7.6.4. Wall Street Culture
  • 7.7. Concern About Consequences
  • 7.7.1. Secrecy
  • 7.7.2. Disregard
  • 7.8. Greed and Hubris
  • 7.9. Short-Term Narrow-Focused Rewards
  • 7.10. Historic Precedence
  • 7.11. Systems Thinking Interpretation
  • 7.11.1. Candidate Leverage Point
  • 7.11.2. Current Activities
  • 7.12. Summary
  • pt. III The Yang: Economic Mechanisms
  • 8. What Goes Up Must Come Down: The Housing Bubble
  • 8.1. Bubble History
  • 8.2. The Rise and Fall of the Housing Bubble
  • 8.3. Affordability and the Housing Bubble
  • 8.4. Supply, Demand, and the Housing Bubble
  • 8.4.1. Demand Indicators
  • 8.4.2. Supply Indicators
  • 8.4.3. Housing Bubble Behavior: 2000 to 2006
  • 8.4.4. Housing Bubble Behavior: 2006 to 2008
  • 8.4.5. Housing Bubble Behavior: 2008 to 2010
  • 8.5. Reasons for Supply and Demand Shifts
  • 8.5.1. Inflation
  • 8.5.2. Income
  • 8.5.3. Monetary Policy
  • 8.5.4. Other Forces
  • 8.5.4.1. Shift in Demand: Consumer Expectation
  • 8.5.4.2. Shift in Demand: Financial Resources and Availability of Credit
  • 8.5.4.3. Shift in Supply: Expectation of Builders
  • 8.5.4.4. Shift in Supply: Unanticipated Influx of Homes for Sale
  • 8.6. Supply and Demand Shift Synopsis
  • 8.7. Systems Thinking Interpretation
  • 8.7.1. Stability
  • 8.7.2. Growth
  • 8.7.3. Decline
  • 8.7.4. Candidate Leverage Points
  • 8.8. Summary
  • 9. On Top of Debt Mountain: High-Risk Loans and Credit
  • 9.1. Journey Segment One: Easy Availability of Credit
  • 9.1.1. Policies and Incentives for Home Buying
  • 9.1.2.Competition for Mortgage Loan Market
  • 9.1.3. Expanded Securitization of Subprime Loans
  • 9.1.4. Convergence of Pressure for Easy Credit
  • 9.2. Journey Segment Two: High-Risk Loans
  • 9.2.1. Subprime and ARM Loans
  • 9.2.2. Growth of Risk
  • 9.3. Journey Segment Three: Accumulation of Debt
  • 9.3.1. Home Ownership Loans
  • 9.3.2. Home Equity Loans
  • 9.3.3. Consumer Credit
  • 9.3.4. Systems Description of Debt Growth
  • 9.3.5. Weakened Limits for Debt
  • 9.4. Journey Segment Four: Defaults, Bankruptcies, and Foreclosures
  • 9.4.1. Waves of Loan Defaults
  • 9.4.2. Transition from Default to Delinquency and Foreclosure
  • 9.5. Systems Thinking Interpretation
  • 9.5.1. Housing Bubble and Debt Dynamics
  • 9.5.2. Debt, Defaults, Bankruptcies, and Foreclosures
  • 9.5.3. Foreclosures, Expectations, and Housing Prices
  • 9.5.4. Foreclosures and Supply
  • 9.5.5. The Housing Bubble Inflates
  • 9.5.6. The Housing Bubble Bursts
  • 9.5.6.1. Overshoot-and-Col lapse of Debt
  • 9.5.6.2. Overshoot-and-Col lapse of Expectation
  • 9.5.6.3. Overshoot-and-Col lapse of Housing Prices
  • 9.5.7. Future Forecast
  • 9.5.7.1. Shadow Inventory
  • 9.5.7.2. Erosion of Capacity for Economic Growth
  • 9.5.8. Candidate Leverage Points
  • 9.5.8.1. Leverage to Dampen Growth of Housing Prices and Risky Debt
  • 9.5.8.2. Leverage to Slow Decay
  • 9.5.9. Current Activities
  • 9.6. Summary
  • 10. The Risk Tiger Pounces: Financial Market, Risk, and Securitization
  • 10.1. Securitization, Structuring, and Derivatives in the Financial Market
  • 10.1.1. The Money-Making Machine
  • 10.1.2. Risk Multipliers
  • 10.1.3. Securities Issuers
  • 10.1.3.1. Volume of Mortgage-Backed Securities
  • 10.1.3.2. Volume of Collateralized Debt Obligations
  • 10.1.3.3. Other Risk Multipliers from Securities Sellers
  • 10.1.4. CDS Sellers
  • 10.1.5. Federal Government
  • 10.1.6. Rating Agencies
  • 10.1.7. Financial Organizations
  • 10.2. Systems Thinking Interpretation
  • 10.2.1. Defaults in the Financial Market
  • 10.2.2. Consequences
  • 10.2.3. Systems Integration of Loans, Securities, and Derivatives
  • 10.2.4. Candidate Leverage Points
  • 10.2.5. Current Activities
  • 10.3. Summary
  • pt. IV Yin and Yang: Integration
  • 11. Human Roots Are Deep: Yin Meets Yang
  • 11.1. Expectations
  • 11.2. Self-Interest and Social Interest
  • 11.2.1. Moral Grounding
  • 11.2.2. Awareness
  • 11.2.3. Human Defense Mechanisms
  • 11.2.4. Short-Term Narrow-Focused Rewards
  • 11.3. Material Desires
  • 11.4. Greed
  • 11.5. Economic Environment
  • 11.6. Search for Meaning
  • 11.7. Systems Thinking Interpretation
  • 11.7.1. Integrating Self-Interest and Social Interest with Debt Dynamics
  • 11.7.2. Integrating Greed, Ethics, and Consequences
  • 11.7.3. Integrating the Housing and Financial Markets
  • 11.7.4. Candidate Leverage Points
  • 11.7.4.1. Category 1: Expand Awareness of Consequences
  • 11.7.4.2. Category 2: Harness Corporate Influence
  • 11.7.5. Integrating Human-Related Levers
  • 11.7.6. Current Activities
  • 11.7.6.1. Self-Interest
  • 11.7.6.2. Concern about Consequences and Social Interest
  • 11.8. Summary.
  • 12. It's a Small World After All: Global Implications and the Road Ahead
  • 12.1. Economic Truths About the Crisis
  • 12.2. Summary of Crisis Dynamics
  • 12.3. An Expanded Systems Perspective
  • 12.3.1. Reinforcing and Balancing Loops
  • 12.3.2. External Influences
  • 12.3.3. Outputs
  • 12.3.4. Global System Interactions. 12.3.4.1. Monetary Policy Balancing Loop
  • 12.3.4.2. National Economic Health Reinforcing Loop
  • 12.3.4.3. International Economic Health Reinforcing Loop
  • 12.4. Conclusions from the Expanded Systems View
  • 12.4.1. Leverage Areas, Potential Pitfalls, and Recommended Actions
  • 12.4.1.1. Area 1: Limit High-Risk Debt
  • 12.4.1.2. Area 2: Reform the Market for Securities and Derivatives
  • 12.4.1.3. Area 3: Decrease Unethical Behavior
  • 12.4.1.4. Area 4: Apply Positive Motivation
  • 12.4.1.5. Area 5: Maintain Confidence in the Economy
  • 12.4.2. Strategic Leverage
  • 12.5. Systems Thinking as a Tool
  • 12.5.1. Balance
  • 12.5.2. Lag
  • 12.5.3. Interdependence
  • 12.5.4. Limits
  • 12.6. Effectiveness of Current Economic Policies
  • 12.6.1. Philosophy Behind Current Actions
  • 12.6.2. Are Current Actions Enough?
  • 12.7. Yin and Yang Reprise
  • 12.8. Implications for the Future
  • 12.9. Concluding Remarks.