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Plans and disequilibria in centrally planned economies : empirical investigation for Poland /

The purpose of this study is to investigate interrelations between planning mechanisms and disequilibria in a case where the planning decisions are centralized and are exogenously given to enterprises. The first introductory chapter is intended to provide an understanding of Poland's economic s...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Charemza, Wojciech
Otros Autores: Gronicki, Miros�aw
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Amsterdam ; New York : Warsaw : New York, N.Y. : North-Holland ; PWN-Polish Scientific Publishers ; Sole distributors for the U.S.A. and Canada, Elsevier Science Pub. Co., 1988.
Colección:Contributions to economic analysis ; 159.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Front Cover; Plans and Disequilibria in Centrally Planned Economies: (Empirical Investigation for Poland); Copyright Page; Introduction to the Series; Table of Contents; Preface; Part 1: Foundations; Chapter 1. Background: Facts and figures from Polish economic history; Chapter 2. The theoretical model; 2.1. Households' behaviour and expectations; 2.2. State sector behaviour; 2.3. Disequilibrium indicators; Part 2: Consumption-Labour-Money Analysis; Chapter 3. Econometric model and its estimation; 3.1. Structural form and statistical data; 3.2. Respecification and preliminary estimation
  • 3.3. Final estimation3.4. Linearization; Chapter 4. Estimates of disequilibria and their effects; 4.1. Estimates of unconditional disequilibria; 4.2. Measures of repressed inflation; 4.3. Excess demand decomposition and estimates of conditional disequilibria; Chapter 5. Internal monetary policies; 5.1. Policy simulations: Some theoretical and technical questions; 5.2. A simple PW policy; 5.3. Planning distance and expectations errors; 5.4. PW(B) policy and labour hoardings; 5.5. Change of currency: Was it a solution?; Chapter 6. Searching for an optimal monetary policy
  • 6.1. Disequilibrium neutralization as an optimal control problem6.2. Households' optimal income and money policies; 6.3. Optimal policies and plans; Part 3: Extensions; Chapter 7. Disequilibria and investments: Some inward policies; 7.1. Production and investments: First extension of the model; 7.2. Inward effects of the PWH(B) policy: Consumption volume and planners' tensions; 7.3. Direct interventions in investment: Smoothing and private economy problem; 7.4. Under- and overinvestment in a long-run; Chapter 8. Disequilibria and foreign trade : Some external policies
  • 8.1. Foreign trade: A further extension of the model8.2. Constant foreign debt isolated policy; 8.3. Constant foreign debt and CMEA acitve policy; Chapter 9. Summary and conclusions: The best ex-post scenario?; Appendix; References; List of Tables; Author Index; Subject Index