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Corruption : a study in political economy /
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
New York :
Academic Press,
�1978.
|
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Front Cover; Corruption: A Study in Political Economy; Copyright page; Dedication; Table of Contents; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; Part 1: Introduction; CHAPTER 1. CORRUPTION AS A PROBLEM IN POLITICAL ECONOMY; 1. CORRUPTION AND THE MIXED ECONOMY; 2. AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS AND FUNCTIONAL BRIBERY; 3. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT; Part 2: Legislative Corruption; CHAPTER 2. CORRUPTION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: THE COST OF INFLUENCE IN AN INDIVIDUALISTIC LEGISLATURE; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. CORRUPTION IN A PERFECT DEMOCRATIC STATE; 3. POLITICIANS WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION
- 4. THE STRUCTURE OF INTEREST GROUP ORGANIZATION5. CONCLUSIONS; APPENDIX 2.1. AN EXAMPLE THAT GENERATES THE UTILITY SURFACES IN FIGURE 2.1; APPENDIX 2.2. COMPETITIVE BRIBERY IN AN INDIVIDUALISTIC LEGISLATURE; CHAPTER 3. INTEREST GROUP ACTIVITY AND THE LEGISLATURE: CORRUPTION, CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS, AND LOBBYING; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. IGNORANCE, APATHY, AND THE ROLE OF WEALTH; 3. MONOPOLY POWER AND LEGISLATIVE CORRUPTION; 4. INTEREST GROUP RESOURCES AND ORGANIZATION; 5. CONCLUSIONS; CHAPTER 4. BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. LOW-LEVEL CORRUPTION
- 3. HIGH-LEVEL CORRUPTION4. TRADING FAVORS FOR VOTES; 5. POLITICAL SYSTEMS WITHOUT A SEPARATION OF POWERS; 6. CONCLUSIONS: THE PUBLIC POLICY CONSEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL PAYOFFS; APPENDIX. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUREAUCRATIC OUTPUT AND ""RED TAPE""; Part 3: Bureaucratie Corruption; CHAPTER 5. LINING UP AND PAYING OFF; 1. LOW-LEVEL CORRUPTION: AN OVERVIEW; 2. THE EFFICIENCY OF BRIBERY; 3. SINGLE LINES AND PRIORITY QUEUES; 4. CORRUPTION AND THE RISK OF DETECTION; 5. CONCLUSIONS; APPENDIX; CHAPTER 6. MONOPOLISTIC BUREAUCRACY; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. A SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS
- 3. FORMAL MODELS4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS; CHAPTER 7. COMPETITIVE BUREAUCRACY: CORRUPTION IN REGULATORY AND SOCIAL PROGRAMS; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. THE BASIC MODEL; 3. SUPPLY AND DEMAND FUNCTIONS; 4. THE CORRUPT MARKET; 5. CONCLUSIONS; APPENDIX; CHAPTER 8. COMPETITIVE BUREAUCRACY: VAGUENESS, COERCION, AND MARKET STRUCTURE; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. CHOOSING THOSE WHO QUALIFY; 3. COERCIVE PROGRAMS; 4. CUSTOMERS WITH MONOPOLY POWER; 5. CONCLUSIONS; CHAPTER 9. BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE AND CORRUPTION; 1. INTRODUCTION: FOUR MODELS OF BUREAUCRACY; 2. THE FRAGMENTED AND SEQUENTIAL MODELS
- 3. THE HIERARCHICAL MODEL4. CHOOSING THE LEAST CORRUPT FORM OF BUREAUCRACY; 5. DISORGANIZED BUREAUCRACIES; 6. CONCLUSIONS; CHAPTER 10. CORRUPTION AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. PRIVATE FIRM ORGANIZATION AND CORRUPTION; 3. THE CORRUPTION OF CORPORATE BOARDS AND TOP MANAGERS; 4. MARKET FAILURE AS A CAUSE OF CORRUPTION; 5. CONCLUSIONS: CORRUPT INCENTIVES IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS; Part 4: Conclusion; CHAPTER 11. CONCLUSIONS: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND MORALITY; 1. CORRUPTION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY; 2. LOW-LEVEL CORRUPTION; 3. MORALITY, CORRUPTION, AND ECONOMIC THEORY