|
|
|
|
LEADER |
00000cam a2200000 i 4500 |
001 |
SCIDIR_ocn551375567 |
003 |
OCoLC |
005 |
20231117032856.0 |
006 |
m o d |
007 |
cr bn||||||abp |
007 |
cr bn||||||ada |
008 |
100311s1978 nyua ob 001 0 eng d |
010 |
|
|
|z 78006170
|
040 |
|
|
|a OCLCE
|b eng
|e pn
|c OCLCE
|d OCLCQ
|d OCLCF
|d OPELS
|d YDXCP
|d OCLCQ
|d UKAHL
|d VLY
|d OCLCO
|d OCLCQ
|d INARC
|d OCLCO
|
019 |
|
|
|a 609478024
|a 974619315
|a 974670891
|a 1100898078
|a 1391397215
|
020 |
|
|
|a 0125963505
|q (electronic bk.)
|
020 |
|
|
|a 9780125963503
|q (electronic bk.)
|
020 |
|
|
|a 9781483289069
|q (e-book)
|
020 |
|
|
|a 1483289060
|
035 |
|
|
|a (OCoLC)551375567
|z (OCoLC)609478024
|z (OCoLC)974619315
|z (OCoLC)974670891
|z (OCoLC)1100898078
|z (OCoLC)1391397215
|
042 |
|
|
|a dlr
|
050 |
|
4 |
|a JF1081
|b .R67
|
082 |
0 |
4 |
|a 320.4
|
100 |
1 |
|
|a Rose-Ackerman, Susan.
|
245 |
1 |
0 |
|a Corruption :
|b a study in political economy /
|c Susan Rose-Ackerman.
|
260 |
|
|
|a New York :
|b Academic Press,
|c �1978.
|
300 |
|
|
|a 1 online resource (xii, 258 pages) :
|b illustrations
|
336 |
|
|
|a text
|b txt
|2 rdacontent
|
337 |
|
|
|a computer
|b c
|2 rdamedia
|
338 |
|
|
|a online resource
|b cr
|2 rdacarrier
|
504 |
|
|
|a Includes bibliographical references (pages 235-245).
|
500 |
|
|
|a Includes indexes.
|
506 |
|
|
|3 Use copy
|f Restrictions unspecified
|5 MiAaHDL
|2 star
|
533 |
|
|
|a Electronic reproduction.
|b [Place of publication not identified] :
|c HathiTrust Digital Library,
|d 2010.
|5 MiAaHDL
|
538 |
|
|
|a Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
|u http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
|5 MiAaHDL
|
583 |
1 |
|
|a digitized
|c 2010
|h HathiTrust Digital Library
|l committed to preserve
|5 MiAaHDL
|2 pda
|
588 |
0 |
|
|a Print version record.
|
505 |
0 |
|
|a Front Cover; Corruption: A Study in Political Economy; Copyright page; Dedication; Table of Contents; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; Part 1: Introduction; CHAPTER 1. CORRUPTION AS A PROBLEM IN POLITICAL ECONOMY; 1. CORRUPTION AND THE MIXED ECONOMY; 2. AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS AND FUNCTIONAL BRIBERY; 3. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT; Part 2: Legislative Corruption; CHAPTER 2. CORRUPTION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: THE COST OF INFLUENCE IN AN INDIVIDUALISTIC LEGISLATURE; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. CORRUPTION IN A PERFECT DEMOCRATIC STATE; 3. POLITICIANS WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION
|
505 |
8 |
|
|a 4. THE STRUCTURE OF INTEREST GROUP ORGANIZATION5. CONCLUSIONS; APPENDIX 2.1. AN EXAMPLE THAT GENERATES THE UTILITY SURFACES IN FIGURE 2.1; APPENDIX 2.2. COMPETITIVE BRIBERY IN AN INDIVIDUALISTIC LEGISLATURE; CHAPTER 3. INTEREST GROUP ACTIVITY AND THE LEGISLATURE: CORRUPTION, CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS, AND LOBBYING; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. IGNORANCE, APATHY, AND THE ROLE OF WEALTH; 3. MONOPOLY POWER AND LEGISLATIVE CORRUPTION; 4. INTEREST GROUP RESOURCES AND ORGANIZATION; 5. CONCLUSIONS; CHAPTER 4. BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. LOW-LEVEL CORRUPTION
|
505 |
8 |
|
|a 3. HIGH-LEVEL CORRUPTION4. TRADING FAVORS FOR VOTES; 5. POLITICAL SYSTEMS WITHOUT A SEPARATION OF POWERS; 6. CONCLUSIONS: THE PUBLIC POLICY CONSEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL PAYOFFS; APPENDIX. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUREAUCRATIC OUTPUT AND ""RED TAPE""; Part 3: Bureaucratie Corruption; CHAPTER 5. LINING UP AND PAYING OFF; 1. LOW-LEVEL CORRUPTION: AN OVERVIEW; 2. THE EFFICIENCY OF BRIBERY; 3. SINGLE LINES AND PRIORITY QUEUES; 4. CORRUPTION AND THE RISK OF DETECTION; 5. CONCLUSIONS; APPENDIX; CHAPTER 6. MONOPOLISTIC BUREAUCRACY; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. A SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS
|
505 |
8 |
|
|a 3. FORMAL MODELS4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS; CHAPTER 7. COMPETITIVE BUREAUCRACY: CORRUPTION IN REGULATORY AND SOCIAL PROGRAMS; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. THE BASIC MODEL; 3. SUPPLY AND DEMAND FUNCTIONS; 4. THE CORRUPT MARKET; 5. CONCLUSIONS; APPENDIX; CHAPTER 8. COMPETITIVE BUREAUCRACY: VAGUENESS, COERCION, AND MARKET STRUCTURE; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. CHOOSING THOSE WHO QUALIFY; 3. COERCIVE PROGRAMS; 4. CUSTOMERS WITH MONOPOLY POWER; 5. CONCLUSIONS; CHAPTER 9. BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE AND CORRUPTION; 1. INTRODUCTION: FOUR MODELS OF BUREAUCRACY; 2. THE FRAGMENTED AND SEQUENTIAL MODELS
|
505 |
8 |
|
|a 3. THE HIERARCHICAL MODEL4. CHOOSING THE LEAST CORRUPT FORM OF BUREAUCRACY; 5. DISORGANIZED BUREAUCRACIES; 6. CONCLUSIONS; CHAPTER 10. CORRUPTION AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. PRIVATE FIRM ORGANIZATION AND CORRUPTION; 3. THE CORRUPTION OF CORPORATE BOARDS AND TOP MANAGERS; 4. MARKET FAILURE AS A CAUSE OF CORRUPTION; 5. CONCLUSIONS: CORRUPT INCENTIVES IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS; Part 4: Conclusion; CHAPTER 11. CONCLUSIONS: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND MORALITY; 1. CORRUPTION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY; 2. LOW-LEVEL CORRUPTION; 3. MORALITY, CORRUPTION, AND ECONOMIC THEORY
|
650 |
|
0 |
|a Political corruption
|x Economic aspects.
|
650 |
|
6 |
|a Corruption (Politique)
|0 (CaQQLa)201-0029856
|x Aspect �economique.
|0 (CaQQLa)201-0374333
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Political corruption
|x Economic aspects
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst01069242
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Corruption politique
|x Aspect �economique.
|2 ram
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Bureaucratie
|x Aspect �economique.
|2 ram
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Corruption.
|2 ram
|
776 |
0 |
8 |
|i Print version:
|a Rose-Ackerman, Susan.
|t Corruption.
|d New York : Academic Press, �1978
|w (DLC) 78006170
|w (OCoLC)3843148
|
856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://sciencedirect.uam.elogim.com/science/book/9780125963503
|z Texto completo
|