Cargando…
Auction theory /
Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this boo...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
San Diego :
Academic Press,
�2002.
|
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
MARC
| LEADER | 00000cam a2200000 a 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | SCIDIR_ocn213298431 | ||
| 003 | OCoLC | ||
| 005 | 20231117015058.0 | ||
| 006 | m o d | ||
| 007 | cr cn||||||||| | ||
| 008 | 080310s2002 caua ob 001 0 eng d | ||
| 040 | |a OPELS |b eng |e pn |c OPELS |d OPELS |d OCLCQ |d N$T |d YDXCP |d IDEBK |d EBLCP |d E7B |d OCLCQ |d REDDC |d OCLCQ |d OCLCF |d OCLCQ |d UKDOC |d DEBSZ |d OCLCQ |d LOA |d AGLDB |d MOR |d ZCU |d OCLCQ |d MERUC |d OCLCQ |d U3W |d VNS |d OCLCQ |d VTS |d ICG |d OCLCQ |d VT2 |d STF |d LEAUB |d DKC |d AU@ |d OCLCQ |d M8D |d OL$ |d OCLCQ |d K6U |d UKCRE |d BOL |d OCLCQ |d OCLCO |d UKAHL |d OCLCO |d OCLCQ |d OCLCO | ||
| 019 | |a 155856396 |a 299752215 |a 648300179 |a 742285400 |a 815530461 |a 823109135 |a 823829653 |a 823899358 |a 824090631 |a 824138236 |a 961695348 |a 962729748 |a 966248220 |a 988499648 |a 1081185152 |a 1114357999 |a 1153548347 | ||
| 020 | |a 9780124262973 | ||
| 020 | |a 012426297X | ||
| 020 | |a 9780080475967 |q (electronic bk.) | ||
| 020 | |a 0080475965 |q (electronic bk.) | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)213298431 |z (OCoLC)155856396 |z (OCoLC)299752215 |z (OCoLC)648300179 |z (OCoLC)742285400 |z (OCoLC)815530461 |z (OCoLC)823109135 |z (OCoLC)823829653 |z (OCoLC)823899358 |z (OCoLC)824090631 |z (OCoLC)824138236 |z (OCoLC)961695348 |z (OCoLC)962729748 |z (OCoLC)966248220 |z (OCoLC)988499648 |z (OCoLC)1081185152 |z (OCoLC)1114357999 |z (OCoLC)1153548347 | ||
| 050 | 4 | |a HF5476 |b .K75 2002eb | |
| 072 | 7 | |a MAT |x 011000 |2 bisacsh | |
| 082 | 0 | 4 | |a 519.3 |2 22 |
| 100 | 1 | |a Krishna, Vijay. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Auction theory / |c Vijay Krishna. |
| 260 | |a San Diego : |b Academic Press, |c �2002. | ||
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (xi, 303 pages) : |b illustrations | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 340 | |g polychrome. |2 rdacc |0 http://rdaregistry.info/termList/RDAColourContent/1003 | ||
| 347 | |a text file |2 rdaft |0 http://rdaregistry.info/termList/fileType/1002 | ||
| 520 | |a Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field. *The standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions *Explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information *Uses accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory. | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a Private Value Auctions; The Revenue Equivalence Principle; Qualifications and Extensions; Mechanism Design; Auctions with Interdependent Values; The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle; Asymmetries and Other Complications; Efficiency and the English Auction; Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values; Bidding Rings; An Introduction to Multiple Object Auctions; Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values; Some Revenue Considerations; Sequential Sales; Nonidentical Objects; Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values; Appendices: Continuous Distributions' Stochastic Orders; Order Statistics; Affiliated Random Variables; Some Linear Algebra; Games of Incomplete Information; Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions. | |
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 289-297) and index. | ||
| 588 | 0 | |a Print version record. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Auctions |x Mathematical models. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Game theory. | |
| 650 | 2 | |a Game Theory |0 (DNLM)D005716 | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Vente aux ench�eres |0 (CaQQLa)201-0001297 |x Mod�eles math�ematiques. |0 (CaQQLa)201-0379082 | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Th�eorie des jeux. |0 (CaQQLa)201-0007580 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a MATHEMATICS |x Game Theory. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Auctions |x Mathematical models |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst00820974 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Game theory |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst00937501 | |
| 650 | 1 | 7 | |a Speltheorie. |2 gtt |
| 650 | 1 | 7 | |a Veilingen. |2 gtt |
| 650 | 7 | |a Leil�ao (modelos matem�aticos) |2 larpcal | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Teoria dos jogos. |2 larpcal | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Krishna, Vijay. |t Auction theory. |d San Diego : Academic Press, �2002 |z 012426297X |z 9780124262973 |w (DLC) 2001098962 |w (OCoLC)49676565 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://sciencedirect.uam.elogim.com/science/book/9780124262973 |z Texto completo |