The economics of electricity markets /

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"The book covers the basic modelling of electricity markets, including the impact of uncertainty, an integral part of generation investment decisions and transmission cost-benefit analysis"--

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Biggar, Darryl R. (Darryl Ross)
Otros Autores: Hesamzadeh, Mohammad
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Chichester, West Sussex, United Kingdom : Wiley, 2014.
Colección:Wiley - IEEE.
Temas:
Electric power consumption.
Electric power > Economic aspects.
Electric utilities.
Électricité > Consommation.
Électricité > Aspect économique.
Services publics d'électricité.
electric utilities.
SCIENCE > Energy.
Electric power consumption
Electric power > Economic aspects
Electric utilities
Business & Economics.
Industries.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo (Requiere registro previo con correo institucional)
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • pt. I INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
  • 1. Introduction to Micro-economics
  • 1.1. Economic Objectives
  • 1.2. Introduction to Constrained Optimisation
  • 1.3. Demand and Consumers' Surplus
  • 1.3.1. The Short-Run Decision of the Customer
  • 1.3.2. The Value or Utility Function
  • 1.3.3. The Demand Curve for a Price-Taking Customer Facing a Simple Price
  • 1.4. Supply and Producers' Surplus
  • 1.4.1. The Cost Function
  • 1.4.2. The Supply Curve for a Price-Taking Firm Facing a Simple Price
  • 1.5. Achieving Optimal Short-Run Outcomes Using Competitive Markets
  • 1.5.1. The Short-Run Welfare Maximum
  • 1.5.2. An Autonomous Market Process
  • 1.6. Smart Markets
  • 1.6.1. Smart Markets and Generic Constraints
  • 1.6.2.A Smart Market Process
  • 1.7. Longer-Run Decisions by Producers and Consumers
  • 1.7.1. Investment in Productive Capacity
  • 1.8. Monopoly
  • 1.8.1. The Dominant Firm
  • Competitive Fringe Structure
  • 1.8.2. Monopoly and Price Regulation.
  • 1.9. Oligopoly
  • 1.9.1. Cournot Oligopoly
  • 1.9.2. Repeated Games
  • 1.10. Summary
  • Questions
  • Further Reading
  • pt. II INTRODUCTION TO ELECTRICITY NETWORKS AND ELECTRICITY MARKETS
  • 2. Introduction to Electric Power Systems
  • 2.1. DC Circuit Concepts
  • 2.1.1. Energy, Watts and Power
  • 2.1.2. Losses
  • 2.2. AC Circuit Concepts
  • 2.3. Reactive Power
  • 2.3.1. Mathematics of Reactive Power
  • 2.3.2. Control of Reactive Power
  • 2.3.3. Ohm's Law on AC Circuits
  • 2.3.4. Three-Phase Power
  • 2.4. The Elements of an Electric Power System
  • 2.5. Electricity Generation
  • 2.5.1. The Key Characteristics of Electricity Generators
  • 2.6. Electricity Transmission and Distribution Networks
  • 2.6.1. Transmission Networks
  • 2.6.2. Distribution Networks
  • 2.6.3.Competition and Regulation
  • 2.7. Physical Limits on Networks
  • 2.7.1. Thermal Limits
  • 2.7.2. Voltage Stability Limits
  • 2.7.3. Dynamic and Transient Stability Limits
  • 2.8. Electricity Consumption.
  • 2.9. Does it Make Sense Distinguish Electricity Producer's and Consumers?
  • 2.9.1. The Service Provided by the Electric Power Industry
  • 2.10. Summary
  • Questions
  • Further Reading
  • 3. Electricity Industry Market Structure and Competition
  • 3.1. Tasks Performed in an Efficient Electricity Industry
  • 3.1.1. Short-Term Tasks
  • 3.1.2. Risk-Management Tasks
  • 3.1.3. Long-Term Tasks
  • 3.2. Electricity Industry Reforms
  • 3.2.1. Market-Orientated Reforms of the Late Twentieth Century
  • 3.3. Approaches to Reform of the Electricity Industry
  • 3.4. Other Key Roles in a Market-Orientated Electric Power System
  • 3.5. An Overview of Liberalised Electricity Markets
  • 3.6. An Overview of the Australian National Electricity Market
  • 3.6.1. Assessment of the NEM
  • 3.7. The Pros and Cons of Electricity Market Reform
  • 3.8. Summary
  • Questions
  • Further Reading
  • pt. III OPTIMAL DISPATCH: THE EFFICIENT USE OF GENERATION, CONSUMPTION AND NETWORK RESOURCES.
  • 4. Efficient Short-Term Operation of an Electricity Industry with no Network Constraints
  • 4.1. The Cost of Generation
  • 4.2. Simple Stylised Representation of a Generator
  • 4.3. Optimal Dispatch of Generation with Inelastic Demand
  • 4.3.1. Optimal Least Cost Dispatch of Generation Resources
  • 4.3.2. Least Cost Dispatch for Generators with Constant Variable Cost
  • 4.3.3. Example
  • 4.4. Optimal Dispatch of Both Generation and Load Assets
  • 4.5. Symmetry in the Treatment of Generation and Load
  • 4.5.1. Symmetry Between Buyer-Owned Generators and Stand-Alone
  • Generators
  • 4.5.2. Symmetry Between Total Surplus Maximisation and Generation Cost Minimisation
  • 4.6. The Benefit Function
  • 4.7. Nonconvexities in Production: Minimum Operating Levels
  • 4.8. Efficient Dispatch of Energy-Limited Resources
  • 4.8.1. Example
  • 4.9. Efficient Dispatch in the Presence of Ramp-Rate Constraints
  • 4.9.1. Example
  • 4.10. Startup Costs and the Unit-Commitment Decision.
  • 4.11. Summary
  • Questions
  • Further Reading
  • 5. Achieving Efficient Use of Generation and Load Resources using a Market Mechanism in an Industry with no Network Constraints
  • 5.1. Decentralisation, Competition and Market Mechanisms
  • 5.2. Achieving Optimal Dispatch Through Competitive Bidding
  • 5.3. Variation in Wholesale Market Design
  • 5.3.1.Compulsory Gross Pool or Net Pool?
  • 5.3.2. Single Price or Pay-as-Bid?
  • 5.4. Day-Ahead Versus Real-Time Markets
  • 5.4.1. Improving the Quality of Short-Term Price Forecasts
  • 5.4.2. Reducing the Exercise of Market Power
  • 5.5. Price Controls and Rationing
  • 5.5.1. Inadequate Metering and Involuntary Load Shedding
  • 5.6. Time-Varying Demand, the Load-Duration Curve and the Price-Duration Curve
  • 5.7. Summary
  • Questions
  • Further Reading
  • 6. Representing Network Constraints
  • 6.1. Representing Networks Mathematically
  • 6.2.Net Injections, Power Flows and the DC Load Flow Model.
  • 6.2.1. The DC Load Flow Model
  • 6.3. The Matrix of Power Transfer Distribution Factors
  • 6.3.1. Converting between Reference Nodes
  • 6.4. Distribution Factors for Radial Networks
  • 6.5. Constraint Equations and the Set of Feasible Injections
  • 6.6. Summary
  • Questions
  • 7. Efficient Dispatch of Generation and Consumption Resources in the Presence of Network Congestion
  • 7.1. Optimal Dispatch with Network Constraints
  • 7.1.1. Achieving Optimal Dispatch Using a Smart Market
  • 7.2. Optimal Dispatch in a Radial Network
  • 7.3. Optimal Dispatch in a Two-Node Network
  • 7.4. Optimal Dispatch in a Three-Node Meshed Network
  • 7.5. Optimal Dispatch in a Four-Node Network
  • 7.6. Properties of Nodal Prices with a Single Binding Constraint
  • 7.7. How Many Independent Nodal Prices Exist?
  • 7.8. The Merchandising Surplus, Settlement Residues and the Congestion Rents
  • 7.8.1. Merchandising Surplus and Congestion Rents
  • 7.8.2. Settlement Residues.
  • 7.8.3. Merchandising Surplus in a Three-Node Network
  • 7.9.Network Losses
  • 7.9.1. Losses, Settlement Residues and Merchandising Surplus
  • 7.9.2. Losses and Optimal Dispatch
  • 7.10. Summary
  • Questions
  • Further Reading
  • 8. Efficient Network Operation
  • 8.1. Efficient Operation of DC Interconnectors
  • 8.1.1. Entrepreneurial DC Network Operation
  • 8.2. Optimal Network Switching
  • 8.2.1.Network Switching and Network Contingencies
  • 8.2.2.A Worked Example
  • 8.2.3. Entrepreneurial Network Switching?
  • 8.3. Summary
  • Questions
  • Further Reading
  • pt. IV EFFICIENT INVESTMENT IN GENERATION AND CONSUMPTION ASSETS
  • 9. Efficient Investment in Generation and Consumption Assets
  • 9.1. The Optimal Generation Investment Problem
  • 9.2. The Optimal Level of Generation Capacity with Downward Sloping Demand
  • 9.2.1. The Case of Inelastic Demand
  • 9.3. The Optimal Mix of Generation Capacity with Downward Sloping Demand.
  • 9.4. The Optimal Mix of Generation with Inelastic Demand
  • 9.5. Screening Curve Analysis
  • 9.5.1. Using Screening Curves to Assess the Impact of Increased Renewable Penetration
  • 9.5.2. Generation Investment in the Presence of Network Constraints
  • 9.6. Buyer-Side Investment
  • 9.7. Summary
  • Questions
  • Further Reading
  • 10. Market-Based Investment in Electricity Generation
  • 10.1. Decentralised Generation Investment Decisions
  • 10.2. Can We Trust Competitive Markets to Deliver an Efficient Level of Investment in Generation?
  • 10.2.1. Episodes of High Prices as an Essential Part of an Energy-Only Market
  • 10.2.2. The M̀issing Money' Problem
  • 10.2.3. Energy-Only Markets and the Investment Boom
  • Bust Cycle
  • 10.3. Price Caps, Reserve Margins and Capacity Payments
  • 10.3.1. Reserve Requirements
  • 10.3.2. Capacity Markets
  • 10.4. Time-Averaging of Network Charges and Generation Investment
  • 10.5. Summary
  • Questions.
  • pt. V HANDLING CONTINGENCIES: EFFICIENT DISPATCH IN THE VERY SHORT RUN
  • 11. Efficient Operation of the Power System in the Very Short-Run
  • 11.1. Introduction to Contingencies
  • 11.2. Efficient Handling of Contingencies
  • 11.3. Preventive and Corrective Actions
  • 11.4. Satisfactory and Secure Operating States
  • 11.5. Optimal Dispatch in the Very Short Run
  • 11.6. Operating the Power System Ex Ante as though Certain Contingencies have Already Happened
  • 11.7. Examples of Optimal Short-Run Dispatch
  • 11.7.1.A Second Example, Ignoring Network Constraints
  • 11.7.2.A Further Example with Network Constraints
  • 11.8. Optimal Short-Run Dispatch Using a Competitive Market
  • 11.8.1.A Simple Example
  • 11.8.2. Optimal Short-Run Dispatch through Prices
  • 11.8.3. Investment Incentives
  • 11.9. Summary
  • Questions
  • Further Reading
  • 12. Frequency-Based Dispatch of Balancing Services
  • 12.1. The Intradispatch Interval Dispatch Mechanism.
  • 12.2. Frequency-Based Dispatch of Balancing Services
  • 12.3. Implications of Ignoring Network Constraints when Handling Contingencies
  • 12.3.1. The Feasible Set of Injections with a Frequency-Based IDIDM
  • 12.4. Procurement of Frequency-Based Balancing Services
  • 12.4.1. The Volume of Frequency Control Balancing Services Required
  • 12.4.2. Procurement of Balancing Services
  • 12.4.3. Allocating the Costs of Balancing Services
  • 12.5. Summary
  • Questions
  • Further Reading
  • pt. VI MANAGING RISK
  • 13. Managing Intertemporal Price Risks
  • 13.1. Introduction to Forward Markets and Standard Hedge Contracts
  • 13.1.1. Instruments for Managing Risk: Swaps, Caps, Collars and Floors
  • 13.1.2. Swaps
  • 13.1.3. Caps
  • 13.1.4. Floors
  • 13.1.5. Collars (and Related Instruments)
  • 13.2. The Construction of a Perfect Hedge: The Theory
  • 13.2.1. The Design of a Perfect Hedge
  • 13.3. The Construction of a Perfect Hedge: Specific Cases.
  • 13.3.1. Hedging by a Generator with no Cost Uncertainty
  • 13.3.2. Hedging Cost-Shifting Risks
  • 13.4. Hedging by Customers
  • 13.4.1. Hedging by a Customer with a Constant Utility Function
  • 13.4.2. Hedging Utility-Shifting Risks
  • 13.5. The Role of the Trader
  • 13.5.1. Risks Facing Individual Traders
  • 13.6. Intertemporal Hedging and Generation Investment
  • 13.7. Summary
  • Questions
  • 14. Managing Interlocational Price Risk
  • 14.1. The Role of the Merchandising Surplus in Facilitating Interlocational Hedging
  • 14.1.1. Packaging the Merchandising Surplus in a Way that Facilitates Hedging
  • 14.2. Interlocational Transmission Rights: CapFTRs
  • 14.3. Interlocational Transmission Rights: Fixed-Volume FTRs
  • 14.3.1. Revenue Adequacy
  • 14.3.2. Are Fixed-Volume FTRs a Useful Hedging Instrument?
  • 14.4. Interlocational Hedging and Transmission Investment
  • 14.4.1. Infinitesimal Investment in Network Capacity
  • 14.4.2. Lumpy Investment in Network Capacity.
  • 14.5. Summary
  • Questions
  • Further Reading
  • pt. VII MARKET POWER
  • 15. Market Power in Electricity Markets
  • 15.1. An Introduction to Market Power in Electricity Markets
  • 15.1.1. Definition of Market Power
  • 15.1.2. Market Power in Electricity Markets
  • 15.2. How Do Generators Exercise Market Power? Theory
  • 15.2.1. The Price
  • Volume Trade-Off
  • 15.2.2. The Profit-Maximising Choice of Rate of Production for a Generator with Market Power
  • 15.2.3. The Profit-Maximising Offer Curve
  • 15.3. How do Generators Exercise Market Power? Practice
  • 15.3.1. Economic and Physical Withholding
  • 15.3.2. Pricing Up and the Marginal Generator
  • 15.4. The Incentive to Exercise Market Power: The Importance of the Residual Demand Curve
  • 15.4.1. The Shape of the Residual Demand Curve
  • 15.4.2. The Importance of Peak Versus Off-Peak for the Exercise of Market Power
  • 15.4.3. Other Influences on the Shape of the Residual Demand Curve.
  • 15.5. The Incentive to Exercise Market Power: The Impact of the Hedge Position of a Generator
  • 15.5.1. Short-Term Versus Long-Term Hedge Products and the Exercise of Market Power
  • 15.5.2. Hedge Contracts and Market Power
  • 15.6. The Exercise of Market Power by Loads and Vertical Integration
  • 15.6.1. Vertical Integration
  • 15.7. Is the Exercise of Market Power Necessary to Stimulate Generation Investment?
  • 15.8. The Consequences of the Exercise of Market Power
  • 15.8.1. Short-Run Efficiency Impacts of Market Power
  • 15.8.2. Longer-Run Efficiency Impacts of Market Power
  • 15.8.3.A Worked Example
  • 15.9. Summary
  • Questions
  • Further Reading
  • 16. Market Power and Network Congestion
  • 16.1. The Exercise of Market Power by a Single Generator in a Radial Network
  • 16.1.1. The Exercise of Market Power by a Single Generator in a Radial Network: The Theory
  • 16.2. The Exercise of Market Power by a Single Generator in a Meshed Network.
  • 16.3. The Exercise of Market Power by a Portfolio of Generators
  • 16.4. The Effect of Transmission Rights on Market Power
  • 16.5. Summary
  • Questions
  • Further Reading
  • 17. Detecting, Modelling and Mitigating Market Power
  • 17.1. Approaches to Assessing Market Power
  • 17.2. Detecting the Exercise of Market Power Through the Examination of Market Outcomes in the Past
  • 17.2.1. Quantity-Withdrawal Studies
  • 17.2.2. Price
  • Cost Margin Studies
  • 17.3. Simple Indicators of Market Power
  • 17.3.1. Market-Share-Based Measures and the HHI
  • 17.3.2. The PSI and RSI Indicators
  • 17.3.3. Variants of the PSI and RSI Indicators
  • 17.3.4. Measuring the Elasticity of Residual Demand
  • 17.4. Modelling of Market Power
  • 17.4.1. Modelling of Market Power in Practice
  • 17.4.2. Linearisation
  • 17.5. Policies to Reduce Market Power
  • 17.6. Summary
  • Questions
  • Further Reading
  • pt. VIII NETWORK REGULATION AND INVESTMENT
  • 18. Efficient Investment in Network Assets.
  • 18.1. Efficient AC Network Investment
  • 18.2. Financial Implications of Network Investment
  • 18.2.1. The Two-Node Graphical Representation
  • 18.2.2. Financial Indicators of the Benefit of Network Expansion
  • 18.3. Efficient Investment in a Radial Network
  • 18.4. Efficient Investment in a Two-Node Network
  • 18.4.1. Example
  • 18.5. Coordination of Generation and Network Investment in Practice
  • 18.6. Summary
  • Questions
  • Further Reading
  • pt. IX CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
  • 19. Regional Pricing and Its Problems
  • 19.1. An Introduction to Regional Pricing
  • 19.2. Regional Pricing Without Constrained-on and Constrained-off Payments
  • 19.2.1. Short-Run Effects of Regional Pricing in a Simple Network
  • 19.2.2. Effects of Regional Pricing on the Balance Sheet of the System Operator
  • 19.2.3. Long-Run Effects of Regional Pricing on Investment
  • 19.3. Regional Pricing with Constrained-on and Constrained-off Payments.
  • 19.4. Nodal Pricing for Generators/Regional Pricing for Consumers
  • 19.4.1. Side Deals and Net Metering
  • 19.5. Summary
  • Questions
  • Further Reading
  • 20. The Smart Grid and Efficient Pricing of Distribution Networks
  • 20.1. Efficient Pricing of Distribution Networks
  • 20.1.1. The Smart Grid and Distribution Pricing
  • 20.2. Decentralisation of the Dispatch Task
  • 20.2.1. Decentralisation in Theory
  • 20.3. Retail Tariff Structures and the Incentive to Misrepresent Local Production and Consumption
  • 20.3.1. Incentives for Net Metering and the Effective Price
  • 20.4. Incentives for Investment in Controllable Embedded Generation
  • 20.4.1. Incentives for Investment in Intermittent Solar PV Embedded Generation
  • 20.4.2. Retail Tariff Structures and the Death Spiral
  • 20.4.3. An Illustration of the Death Spiral
  • 20.5. Retail Tariff Structures
  • 20.5.1. Retail Tariff Debates
  • 20.6. Declining Demand for Network Services and Increasing Returns to Scale
  • 20.7. Summary
  • Questions.

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