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Explosion Hazards in the Process Industries.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Eckhoff, Rolf K.
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Saint Louis : Elsevier Science, 2016.
Edición:2nd ed.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Front Cover
  • EXPLOSION HAZARDS IN THE PROCESS INDUSTRIES
  • EXPLOSION HAZARDS IN THE PROCESS INDUSTRIES
  • Copyright
  • DEDICATION
  • CONTENTS
  • ABOUT THE AUTHOR
  • PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION
  • PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION
  • One
  • Introduction
  • 1.1 PROCESS SAFETY-A PERSISTENT CHALLENGE
  • 1.2 WHAT IS AN EXPLOSION?
  • 1.3 GAS/VAPOR AND DUST EXPLOSIONS-REAL HAZARDS IN THE PROCESS INDUSTRIES
  • 1.4 HOW AND WHERE ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSIVE GAS/VAPOR AND DUST CLOUDS ARE GENERATED IN THE PROCESS INDUSTRIES: BASIC DIFFERENCES
  • 1.4.1 Similar Ignition and Combustion Properties of Clouds Generated
  • 1.4.2 Influence of Inertial Forces on the Movement of Dust Particles in a Dust Cloud
  • 1.4.3 Fundamental Differences Between the Ways Explosive Clouds Are Generated
  • 1.4.4 Migration of Dust Particles Through Narrow Holes and Gaps in Enclosure Walls
  • 1.5 EUROPEAN DEFINITION OF "EXPLOSIVE ATMOSPHERES"
  • 1.6 DOMINO/ESCALATION EFFECTS FROM ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSIONS
  • 1.7 THE "HUMAN FACTOR" IN PROCESS SAFETY
  • Two
  • Gas and Vapor Cloud Explosions
  • 2.1 COMBUSTION OF GASES AND VAPORS
  • 2.1.1 Diffusion Combustion and "Premixed" Combustion
  • 2.1.2 Laminar Burning of Premixed Gas/Vapor and Air
  • 2.1.3 Flammable Concentration Ranges for Premixed Gas/Vapor and Air
  • 2.1.3.1 General
  • 2.1.3.2 Flash Point of a Combustible Liquid
  • 2.1.3.3 Classification of Flammable Fluids According to Their Flash Points
  • 2.1.4 Maximum Pressures Generated from Constant-Volume Adiabatic Combustion of Premixed Gas/Vapor and Air
  • 2.1.5 The "Expansion Ratio" in Combustion of Premixed Gas/Vapor and Air
  • 2.1.6 Turbulent Combustion of Premixed Gas/Vapor and Air
  • 2.1.7 Detonation of Premixed Gas/Vapor and Air
  • 2.2 IGNITION OF PREMIXED GAS/VAPOR AND AIR
  • 2.2.1 Introduction
  • 2.2.2 What Is Ignition? Basic Theory of "Thermal Runaway".
  • 2.2.3 Ignition by Open Flames and Hot Gases
  • 2.2.4 Ignition by Hot Surfaces
  • 2.2.4.1 Overview
  • 2.2.4.2 Minimum Ignition Temperatures of Multicomponent Fuels in Air
  • 2.2.4.3 Solution for the Future: Dynamic Computer Simulation Models of Hot Surface Ignition
  • 2.2.4.4 Standard Test Methods for Tmin
  • 2.2.5 Ignition by Burning Metal Particles, "Thermite" Reactions, and Transient "Hot-Spots"
  • 2.2.5.1 Introductory Overview
  • 2.2.5.2 Ignition by Small Burning Metal Particles from Single Impacts
  • 2.2.5.3 Ignition by Thermite Flashes
  • 2.2.5.4 Ignition by Transient Hot-Spots
  • 2.2.6 Ignition by Electric Sparks, Arcs, and Electrostatic Discharges
  • 2.2.6.1 Electric Sparks Between Two Conducting Electrodes
  • 2.2.6.2 Various Forms of One-Electrode Electrostatic Discharges from Charged Nonconductors: Concept of "Equivalent Energy"
  • 2.2.7 Ignition by a Jet of Hot Combustion Products
  • 2.2.7.1 The Basic Process
  • 2.2.7.2 Grouping of Ignition Sensitivity of Premixed Gas/Air According to MESG
  • 2.2.8 Ignition by Rapid Adiabatic Compression
  • 2.2.9 Ignition by Light Radiation
  • 2.2.10 Concluding Remark
  • 2.3 CASE HISTORIES OF ACCIDENTAL GAS/VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSIONS
  • 2.3.1 Motivation
  • 2.3.2 Historical Perspective: Methane Explosions in Coal Mines
  • 2.3.3 Some Older Published Reviews of Major Accidental Gas/Vapor Cloud Explosions
  • 2.3.4 The Flixborough Disaster, United Kingdom (1974)
  • 2.3.4.1 Summary
  • 2.3.4.2 The Process and the Plant
  • 2.3.4.3 Events Prior to the Explosion
  • 2.3.4.4 The Explosion
  • 2.3.4.5 The Investigation
  • 2.3.5 The Beek Explosion, The Netherlands (1975)
  • 2.3.5.1 Summary
  • 2.3.5.2 Process and Plant
  • 2.3.5.3 Events Prior to the Explosion
  • 2.3.5.4 The Explosion
  • 2.3.5.5 Computer Simulation
  • 2.3.6 The Arendal Explosion, Gothenburg, Sweden (1981)
  • 2.3.6.1 Summary
  • 2.3.6.2 The Site of the Event.
  • 2.3.6.3 Leak and Vapor Cloud Formation
  • 2.3.6.4 Ignition and Explosion
  • 2.3.7 Methane Explosion in a 17,000m3 Coal Silo at Elkford, British Columbia, Canada (1982)
  • 2.3.7.1 Plant and Process
  • 2.3.7.2 The Explosion and Its Consequences
  • 2.3.7.3 Possible Ignition Source
  • 2.3.8 The "West Vanguard" Explosion in the North Sea (1985)
  • 2.3.8.1 Summary
  • 2.3.8.2 Site of Explosion
  • 2.3.8.3 Events Leading to the Explosion
  • 2.3.8.4 The Ignition Sources
  • 2.3.8.5 The Explosions and Their Consequences
  • 2.3.8.6 Computer Simulations of Gas Explosions
  • 2.3.9 Catastrophic Gas Explosion in Taegu, South Korea, April 1995
  • 2.3.9.1 Overview
  • 2.3.9.2 Circumstances Before the Explosion
  • 2.3.9.3 Possible Causes of Explosion
  • 2.3.9.3.1 Scenario 1
  • 2.3.9.3.2 Scenario 2
  • 2.3.9.3.3 Scenario 3
  • 2.3.9.4 Extent of Explosion and Its Consequences
  • 2.3.9.5 Rescue Operations
  • 2.3.9.6 Lessons Learnt
  • 2.3.9.7 The"Human Factor"
  • 2.3.10 Explosion at Buncefield Oil Storage Depot, United Kingdom in 2005
  • 2.3.10.1 The Main Investigation
  • 2.3.10.2 Were the High Overpressures in the Major Explosion Nevertheless Caused by Trees and Bushes?
  • 2.3.11 The Tesoro Anacortes Refinery Explosion
  • 2.3.11.1 Overview of Similar Accidents in the United States
  • 2.3.11.2 Introduction to Anacortes Refinery Explosion
  • 2.3.11.3 The Chain of Events
  • 2.3.11.4 Further Analysis of the HTHA at the E Heat Exchanger
  • 2.3.11.5 Recommendations and Concerns Expressed by CSB
  • 2.3.11.5.1 Technical Matters
  • 2.3.11.5.2 Organizational Concerns
  • 2.4 MEANS OF PREVENTING AND MITIGATING/CONTROLLING GAS/VAPOR EXPLOSIONS IN THE PROCESS INDUSTRIES
  • 2.4.1 Application of the Concept of "Inherently Safer Plant Design" to Prevention and Mitigation/Control of Accidental Gas/Vapor ...
  • 2.4.1.1 Outline of Basic Concept
  • 2.4.1.2 Examples
  • 2.4.1.2.1 Minimalization.
  • 2.4.1.2.2 Substitution
  • 2.4.1.2.3 Moderation
  • 2.4.1.2.4 Simplification
  • 2.4.2 Preventing, and Limiting Size of, Explosive Gas/Vapor Clouds
  • 2.4.2.1 Preventing Gas Leaks from Process Equipment
  • 2.4.2.1.1 Piping and Vessels
  • 2.4.2.1.2 Flanges and Connections
  • 2.4.2.1.3 Instrumentation, Valves, and Rotating Machinery
  • 2.4.2.2 Minimizing Size of Gas Cloud in Case of Accidental Leaks by Early Leak Detection and Effective Shutdown
  • 2.4.2.2.1 Overall Objective and Performance Criteria of Gas Detection Systems
  • 2.4.2.2.2 Detector Types
  • 2.4.2.2.3 Coverage and Location of Gas Detectors
  • 2.4.2.2.4 Gas Detection Alarms
  • 2.4.2.2.5 Other Issues of Concern Related to Gas Detection Systems Include
  • 2.4.2.2.6 Mist/Spray Detectors
  • 2.4.2.3 Emergency Shutdown Systems (ESD)
  • 2.4.2.3.1 Purpose of ESD Systems
  • 2.4.2.3.2 Manual ESD Activation
  • 2.4.2.3.3 ESD Actions and Documentation
  • 2.4.2.3.4 ESD Alarms
  • 2.4.2.3.5 ESD Response Time/Rate
  • 2.4.2.3.6 ESD Independence, Operating Integrity, Reliability, and Survivability
  • 2.4.2.3.7 ESD Fail-to-Safe Principle
  • 2.4.2.4 ESD Man-Machine Interface
  • 2.4.2.5 Fast Dilution with Air of Gas Leaks by Natural Ventilation and Forced Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Systems (HVAC)
  • 2.4.2.5.1 Overview
  • 2.4.2.5.2 Natural Ventilation in Classified Areas
  • 2.4.2.5.3 Forced/Mechanical Ventilation in Classified Areas
  • 2.4.2.5.4 Documentation and Modification
  • 2.4.3 Preventing Ignition Sources
  • 2.4.3.1 Introduction
  • 2.4.3.2 Open Flames
  • 2.4.3.3 Hot Surfaces
  • 2.4.3.4 Burning Metal Particles, "Thermite" Reactions, and Transient "Hot Spots"
  • 2.4.3.5 Ignition by Electric Sparks, Arcs, and Electrostatic Discharges
  • 2.4.3.6 Ignition by a Jet of Hot Combustion Products
  • 2.4.3.7 Ignition by Light Radiation
  • 2.4.4 Controlling Ignition Sources
  • 2.4.4.1 Introduction.
  • 2.4.4.2 Equipment in Naturally Ventilated, Normally Nonhazardous, Areas
  • 2.4.4.3 Isolation of Electrical Ignition Sources
  • 2.4.4.3.1 Group 1
  • 2.4.4.3.2 Group 2
  • 2.4.4.3.3 Group 3
  • 2.4.4.4 Isolation of Nonelectrical Ignition Sources
  • 2.4.4.4.1 Group 1
  • 2.4.4.4.2 Group 2
  • 2.4.4.4.3 Group 3
  • 2.4.4.5 Cranes
  • 2.4.4.6 Human-Machine Interface (HMI) in Central Control Room
  • 2.4.4.7 Operation, Inspection and Maintenance
  • 2.4.5 Mitigating/Controlling Gas/Vapor Cloud Explosions Once Initiated Despite Preventive Measures
  • 2.4.5.1 Control and Mitigation-Two Different Concepts?
  • 2.4.5.2 Explosion Isolation: Minimizing Explosion Propagation Inside Process Equipment Using Shut-off Valves and Other Physical Bar ...
  • 2.4.5.2.1 Reasons for Using Explosion Isolation
  • 2.4.5.2.2 Mechanical Valves
  • 2.4.5.2.3 Flame Arresters
  • 2.4.5.2.4 Flame Interruption by Automatic Injection of Suppressant
  • 2.4.5.3 Minimizing Gas Cloud Size and Controlling Gas Cloud Location Outside Process Equipment Using Physical Barriers
  • 2.4.5.3.1 The Hazardous Situation in a Brief Historical Perspective
  • 2.4.5.3.2 Definition of a Physical "Barrier"
  • 2.4.5.3.3 Cloud Size and Location Control Barriers
  • 2.4.5.4 Use of Physical Barriers for Controlling Explosion Violence
  • 2.4.5.4.1 Controlling Precompression (Pressure Piling)
  • 2.4.5.4.2 Controlling Turbulence Generation
  • 2.4.5.4.3 Suitable Materials for Soft Barriers
  • 2.4.5.4.4 Additional Hazards to Be Considered When Using Soft Physical Barriers Other Than Water
  • 2.4.5.5 Design of Buildings to Prevent Damage by Gas Explosions
  • 2.4.5.6 Explosion Venting
  • 2.4.5.6.1 What Is Explosion Venting?
  • 2.4.5.6.2 Vent Covers
  • 2.4.5.6.3 Potential Hazards Caused by Venting
  • 2.4.5.6.4 Use of Vent Ducts
  • 2.4.5.6.5 Reaction Forces Caused by Venting.