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Israel's intelligence assessment before the Yom Kippur War disentangling deception and distraction /
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Brighton ; Portland, Or. :
Sussex Academic Press,
2010.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Pt. 1. Israel's security concept and the intelligence concept
- Israel's security concept and its limitations
- The intelligence concept
- pt. 2. Arab military preparations for war through the intelligence prism
- Basic intelligence
- Formulating the intelligence picture
- The essence of warning
- pt. 3. Intelligence assessments and the decision makers
- Is Egypt starting a war?
- Warning from a particular high placed source
- Assessment of readiness and assessment of intentions
- Meetings with the prime minister, the defense minister, and the chief of the general staff
- pt. 4. The mistakes and the failures
- Intelligence's mistaken assessment
- The reasons for the intelligence failure
- pt. 5. The difficulties of intelligence work
- Basic issues in the Intelligence Branch
- Problems with the intelligence assessment before the Yom Kippur War
- pt. 6. Proposed lessons
- Responsibility for assessment of intentions : the role of the leadership
- Organizational lessons
- Lessons on working methods
- Conclusion
- Appendix A: Israel and the Arab States : important dates between the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War
- Appendix B: Intelligence products in the period before the Yom Kippur War
- Appendix C: Emerging lessons in a meeting with the Intelligence Branch director one month after the outbreak of the war
- Appendix D: Personal letter from Intelligence Branch director Major General Aharon Yariv to the author, 27 September 1972
- Appendix E: Letter in praise of this book by Lieutenant General (ret.) Moshe Yaalon, while serving as chief of general staff.