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Snipers, shills, & sharks : eBay and human behavior /
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Princeton :
Princeton University Press,
c2007.
|
| Colección: | Book collections on Project MUSE.
|
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover
- Half-title
- Title
- Copyright
- Dedication
- Contents
- Preface
- To the general reader
- To students and course instructors
- Synopsis
- Acknowledgments
- Chapter One · English and Vickrey Auctions
- 1.1 Auctions
- 1.2 A Brief History
- 1.3 English Auctions
- 1.4 Variations on the English Theme
- 1.5 Truthful Bidding is Dominant in (Japanese Button) English Auctions
- 1.6 Sealed-bid Second-Price (Vickrey) Auctions
- 1.7 Mail-bid Auctions
- 1.8 Weak Strategic Equivalence of (Japanese button) English and Vickrey Auctions
- 1.9 The Four Standard Auctions and Why They Are Two Pairs
- 1.10 Disincentives to truthful bidding
- 1.11 Questions
- Chapter Two · From Vickrey to eBay
- 2.1 eBay as an Evolutionary Product of Vickrey: The California Auction
- 2.2 Other Online Auction Rules
- 2.3 eBay _= Vickrey
- 2.4 Summary
- 2.5 Questions
- Chapter Three · eBay Strategies Observed
- 3.1 Some Bidding Histories
- 3.1.1 Start and End Clustering, Snipers
- 3.1.2 A Bidding War
- 3.1.3 An Early Bidder and Her Fate
- 3.2 "Enter Your Maximum, Then Sit Back and Watch!''
- 3.3 Good Reasons to Snipe
- 3.4 Other (Generally Good) Reasons to Snipe
- 3.4.1 Bidding Wars, Response to Incremental Bidding
- 3.4.2 Implicit Collusion
- 3.4.3 Nonstrategic Reasons to Bid Late
- 3.5 Some (Questionable) Reasons to Bid Early
- 3.5.1 Uncertain Values and the Cost of Discovery
- 3.5.2 Scaring Away Competition
- 3.5.3 Nonstrategic Reasons to Bid Early
- 3.6 On Balance, Snipe
- 3.7 Seller Choices
- 3.7.1 Opening Bid
- 3.7.2 Use of a Secret Reserve
- 3.7.3 Use of the Buy-It-Now Option
- 3.7.4 Other Seller Choices
- 3.8 The Next Three Chapters
- 3.9 Questions
- Chapter Four · What If eBayWere First-Price?
- 4.1 First-Price Is the More Natural Assumption
- 4.2 The Sealed-Bid First-Price Auction
- 4.3 The Simplest of All Worlds.
- 4.3.1 The Independent Private Values (IPV) model
- 4.4 How to Shade
- 4.5 Revenue: The Bottom Line
- 4.6 A First-Price eBay Would Discourage Early Bidding
- 4.7 First-Price Is More Work for the Bidder
- 4.8 Further Theory Disappoints
- 4.9 Conclusion
- 4.10 Questions
- Chapter Five · The Signals that Sellers Send
- 5.1 Reserves
- 5.2 Price Estimates and Related Revelations
- 5.3 Virtue Rewarded, in Theory
- 5.4 Art, Silver, and Jewelry Auctions: Empirical Observations of Seller Price Estimates
- 5.5 The Complexity of the Seller's Signaling
- 5.6 What Theory Has To Say About Reserves
- 5.6.1 The Tradeoff in Second-Price Auctions
- 5.6.2 The Tradeoff in First-Price Auctions
- 5.6.3 The Optimal Reserve
- 5.6.4 The New Equilibrium
- 5.6.5 Practical Implications
- 5.7 Field Experiments
- 5.8 A Field Comparison of Public vs. Secret Reserves on eBay
- 5.9 Lucking-Reiley's Magic Window in Time
- 5.9.1 Field Confirmation of Some First-Price Theory
- 5.10 Flatness of Revenue vs. Reserve Curves
- 5.11 The Importance of the Extra Bidder
- 5.12 Extracting Some Advice for the eBay Seller
- 5.13 Questions
- Chapter Six · Prices!
- 6.1 Appraising the Scaffolding
- 6.1.1 Valuations
- 6.1.2 Equilibrium
- 6.1.3 Homo economicus
- 6.2 Overbidding: Some Classroom Experiments
- 6.2.1 Experiment 1: First-price with Uniformly Distributed Valuations
- 6.2.2 Experiment 2: First-Price with Less Competition
- 6.3 Feedback and Learning
- 6.3.1 Feedback in First-Price Auctions
- 6.3.2 Feedback in Second-Price and English Auctions
- 6.4 Overbidding: Jars of Nickels
- 6.5 Results from the Field: Tests of Revenue Equivalence
- 6.5.1 Magic on the Internet: A Surprise
- 6.5.2 Music CDs and Xboxes on eBay
- 6.6 Reconciliations
- 6.7 Equilibrium Regained
- 6.7.1 Risk Aversion
- 6.7.2 Spite: An Alternative Theory.
- 6.8 The Theoretically Informed (and Human) eBay Bidder
- 6.8.1 Simply a Mistake: Bidding Untruthfully in Vickrey's Setting
- 6.8.2 The Winner's Curse
- 6.8.3 Lessons from the Failures of Revenue Equivalence
- 6.8.4 Spiteful Behavior
- 6.8.5 Wars, Frenzies, and Bubbles
- 6.9 Questions
- Chapter Seven · Transgressions
- 7.1 Shills
- 7.1.1 Shill Bidding and Theory
- 7.1.2 Mock Auctions: The More Important Diamond
- 7.2 Bidder Rings: 84 Charing Cross Road
- 7.3 Ethics
- 7.3.1 The Twinge of Guilt: The Buyer Withholds Information
- 7.3.2 Conversely: The Seller Withholds Information
- 7.3.3 Sniping
- 7.3.4 Shadowing Bidders
- 7.3.5 The Ethics of Feedback
- 7.3.6 Exporting and Importing Ancient Artifacts
- 7.4 A Note on Downright Fraud
- 7.5 Fakes
- 7.6 Questions
- Chapter Eight · Epilogue
- 8.1 Looking Back
- 8.2 Looking Ahead
- Appendix A: Vickrey's Genesis
- A.1 Introduction
- A.2 A Preview of Revenue Equivalence
- A.3 * Quick Review of Some Probability Theory
- A.4 * Order Statistics
- A.5 Revenue of Second-Price Auctions
- A.6 First-Price Auctions and Nash Equilibria
- A.7 Revenue Equivalence of First- and Second-Price Auctions with Uniformly Distributed Values
- A.8 A Nash Equilibrium for First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
- A.9 Revenue of First-Price Auctions
- A.10 * Conditional Expectation
- A.11 An Interpretation of First-Price Equilibrium Bidding Strategy
- A.12 Stronger Revenue Equivalence
- A.13 Dutch Auctions and Strategic Equivalence
- A.14 Another Kind of Auction-the All-Pay Auction
- A.15 Questions
- Appendix B: Riley and Samuelson's Optimal Auctions
- B.1 Definition of Riley and Samuelson's Class
- B.2 Revenue
- B.3 Optimal Reserve Price
- B.3.1 Example: First-Price Auction with Reserve
- B.3.2 Example: Second-Price Auction with Reserve
- B.4 Sad Losers and Santa Claus.
- B.4.1 The Sad-Loser Auction
- B.4.2 The Santa Claus Auction
- B.5 The All-Pay Auction Revisited
- B.6 Risk Aversion
- B.7 Point of Departure
- B.8 Questions
- Appendix C: Myerson's Optimal Mechanisms
- C.1 Directions
- C.2 Interdependent Values
- C.3 Asymmetric Bidders
- C.4 Efficiency
- C.5 Myerson's Optimal Mechanism in the Asymmetric-Bidder Case
- C.5.1 Interlude: Revenue Equivalence Revisited in the Asymmetric-Bidder Case
- C.5.2 The Optimal Allocation Rule
- C.5.3 The Payment Rule
- C.5.4 A Wrinkle
- C.5.5 Is This Practical?
- C.6 Optimal Riley and Samuelson Auctions Are Optimal Mechanisms
- C.7 Auctions vs. Negotiations
- C.8 Summary
- C.9 Questions
- Appendix D: Laboratory Evidence: A Summary
- D.1 Introduction
- D.2 Laboratory Experiments
- D.3 Experimental Results for the IPV Model
- D.4 Experimental Results for the Common-Value Model
- References
- Index.